



# Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions

**A collaborative project in the 7th EU Framework Program**

CPSI Deliverable:

## **Report on Cultural Issues**

Changing Perceptions of Security Requires European Cultural Sensitivity

Deliverable of CPSI Work Package: 4.4

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## Abstract

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**Aims and objective.** This report centres on cultural factors in changing perceptions of security and interventions and in (dis)association between felt and actual security. It develops and applies a qualitative analytical framework to identify and make comparable the cognitive foundations for a society's knowledge management and attitudes in respect of security issues.

**CPSI methodological context.** The CPSI conceptual model and methodology, including the data warehouse, aim to support general conclusions about citizens' fear of crime in relation to actual security and to contribute to an efficiency scheme for designing and assessing interventions and which work best in which settings. A considerable part of the validation of the CPSI model takes place on the local level, based on testing and refining hypotheses gained from literature and morphological analysis in citizen surveys. CPSI WP 4.4 work is dedicated to the other part of validation and data collection, applying a macroanalytical approach (performed on two levels: the government or public policy level and the citizen level) and developing a framework for assessing national security cultures.

**Design.** Cultural analysis in this report is based on a cognitive concept of culture that is applied to two levels of aggregation: the citizen level (focusing on perceptions of security/insecurity) and the government level (focusing on security-enhancing interventions). Building upon this, the report investigates assessments of pre-existing worldviews, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions in the European Union and its Member States, as well as the efficiency perception of technology-based security solutions.

It is among the objectives of the analysis to identify types of citizen security cultures on a comparative basis, based on a secondary analysis of social and victimological survey data which have not been looked at in a comprehensive way before. Rather, cultural accounts of criminology have concentrated on identifying stylized frameworks and cultural space for dealing with citizen security politically.

**Indicative results.** CPSI culture analysis reinforces the assumption from recent theoretical accounts of risk analysis that citizens' knowledge is the key factor for their perception of security and interventions. Knowledge also mediates between felt and actual security. This study thus highlights the need for continued interpretation of security as an information and cognition issue. While cultural factors have a positive impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as national problems, the EU must minimize its negative impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as 'European problems'. At the same time, security was found to continue to be mainly a national cultural value rather than representing a value common to European citizens.


Moreover, knowledge turned out the first-rank effectiveness criteria for security-enhancing interventions. Strong knowledge and interpretative contexts present on the national level are a cultural factor that decreases citizens' individual perception of insecurity. That means, social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime. Actual insecurity particularly increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem "out there") but decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern).

Interventions should in the first place focus on a comprehensive definition or articulation of risk based on exchange of knowledge. Policy interventions based, in contrast, on perceived security have been found to increase citizens' fear of crime.

This study highlights the need for continued interpretation of security as an information and cognition issue. While cultural factors have a positive impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as national problems, they have a negative impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as 'European problems'.

## 1 Scope and Objectives – beyond cultural criminology

This report on cultural issues presents CPSI WP (work package) 4.4<sup>1</sup> research results that in an adapted antecedent version also have fed into the ESRIF WG 10 contribution to part II of the ESRIF Final Report as part of the CPSI dissemination strategy and as reflected in the dissemination plan.<sup>2</sup> This cross-feeding is described in Figure 1.1:



**Figure 1.1: Dissemination between CPSI WP 4.4 and ESRIF WG 10**

Preliminary versions of parts of this deliverable, including raw data, have been published in working papers in order to make intermediate results available for discussion.<sup>3</sup> The present report therefore gives a comprehensive account of the CPSI analysis of cultural factors in security perceptions and interventions.

CPSI's level of exemplification is fear of crime, but this report covers cognitive foundations for a society's knowledge management and attitudes in respect of security issues in a more general perspective. This also provides a context for related work in WP 4 and also WP 2 that assume "socio-cultural" factors *ceteris paribus* and concentrate on fear of crime as an instance of societal perception of (in)security. Nevertheless, the cultural perspective is not alien to a criminological approach.

Prominently, David Garland, in his book *The Culture of Control*, locates fear of crime as a criminological subject of study as well as a public and political concern in the context of the change of the political culture of response to crime as it took place in the Western world in the 1970ies.<sup>4</sup> The decline of the ideal of rehabilitation of convicted, the emergence of new normative ideal of

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<sup>1</sup> The CPSI work package structure is described on the CPSI homepage, <http://www.cpsi-fp7.eu>.

<sup>2</sup> ESRIF is the European Security Research and Innovation Forum, see <http://www.esrif.eu>.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander Siedschlag, "European Countries National Security Research Policy Compared in the Light of FP 7," *Analytical Standpoint* (WWEDU World Wide Education, Wels/Austria – Center for European Security Studies), no. 10 (July 2008) <<http://www.esri.at/eusipo/asp10.pdf>>; Alexander Siedschlag (with Andrea Jerković), "Primary Interpretation of Survey Findings to Identify National Citizen Security Cultures," *Analytical Standpoint* (WWEDU World Wide Education, Wels/Austria – Center for European Security Studies), no. 12 (November 2008) <<http://www.european-security.info/asp12.pdf>>.

<sup>4</sup> David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001, 6-11.

punitiveness and the evolution of “expressive justice” – meaning public shaming and humiliation of culprits together with overemphasizing personal feelings of the victim and public outrage over individual acts of crime – have introduced a new emotional culture into crime policy: Whereas fear of crime originally used to be investigated and politically perceived at the level of “a localized, situational anxiety, affecting the worst-off individuals and neighbourhoods”, it now became “regarded as a major social problem and a characteristic of contemporary culture.”<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, the very concept of *fear of crime* can be read as being a cultural factor – if not “cultural theme”<sup>6</sup> – in itself, rather than being a dependent variable in part influenced by (other) cultural factors.

In fact, in criminological accounts, culture as a concept is often blurred and simply equated with everyday living conditions and conditions of social exclusion and in-group/out-group formation. Culture is also often accounted for in the limited scope of a normative behavioural concept. For example, criminological research has typically identified the following cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat):<sup>7</sup>

- Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by marginalized young men, feeling themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the gender-specific norms they have been socialized into, in order to demonstrate virility.
- Cultural norms that define masculinity and dehumanize people who derive from the dominant culture of normalcy (e.g. violence against homosexual males)
- Political culture providing a breeding ground for hate crimes against people representing otherness.
- Ideological constructions of social systems such as the family that involve a sense of right of – even violent – control e.g. of men over women.
- Cultural norms of acceptable violence such as in sport, schools and entertainment that can however trigger excesses of violence.

A specific approach that seeks to incorporate culture-related reasoning into criminology is *cultural criminology*.<sup>8</sup> It explores the association between cultural and criminal practices, including symbolization of the criminal and criminalization of subcultures. Crime is interpreted as subcultural collective behaviour, entailing symbols, meaning and knowledge that (re)produce criminal identities. Cultural criminology is thus not concerned with security culture in terms of symbolized and cognitive foundations of the perception of threat but sees itself rooted in postmodern reasoning, examining the impact of cultural change in struggling meaning, authority and power.

As can be seen, culturally informed criminological accounts in general cover the side of the offenders rather than that of the victims and look into socialization contexts rather than investigating general rules and investigating descriptors for collective security cultures on a national level, allowing for cross-national comparisons.

To advance the state of the art of a cultural analysis beyond criminological accounts and assess pre-existing worldviews, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions in the European Union and its Member States, as well as the efficiency perception of technology-based security solutions, CPSI cultural analysis approaches the subject matter from a comprehensive security research point of view, with methods based on a cultural theory of risk in order to identify general rules that guide the experience of security in subjective terms. Risk research holds valuable assumptions about cultural determiners of perceived risk and (in)security, following Karl Dake’s cognitive concept of culture as a set of

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Rob(ert Douglas) White and Daphne Habibis, *Crime and Society*. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 67-68.

<sup>8</sup> Jeff Ferrell, “Cultural Criminology,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999): 395-418; Jeff Ferrell and Clinton R. Sanders (eds.), *Cultural Criminology*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1995; Jeff Ferrell, Keith Hayward, Wayne Morrison and Mike Presdee (eds.), *Cultural Criminology Unleashed*. London et al.: Glasshouse Press, 2004.

“orienting dispositions” guiding peoples’ perception and cognitive response to complex situations.<sup>9</sup> Cross-cultural risk research conducted on the basis of Dake’s concept yielded empirical evidence for political macro culture to be a predictor for citizens’ perception of risk:<sup>10</sup> For instance, an egalitarian political culture with a preference for equal distribution of values and assets in the society seems to facilitate higher than actual perception of risk. Conversely, a hierarchical political culture with higher trust in (or locus-of-control attribution to) (public) authorities seems to lower citizens’ risk perception.

Specifically, the report develops and applies a qualitative analytical framework to identify and make comparable the cognitive foundations for a society’s knowledge management and attitudes in respect of security issues, and populates this framework with empirical analysis on a cross-cultural basis (textual analysis and public opinion as well as specific criminological survey data). This is at the same time serves as an addition to the domestic and one-test case focus of empirical analyses performed in other CPSI WPs.

Important research questions addressed are:

- What are feasible qualitative analytical approaches to identify and make comparable the cognitive foundations for a society’s knowledge management and attitudes in respect of security issues?
- How does culture guide the experience of security in subjective terms and how does it mediate the relationship between actual and perceived security?
- How do national perception styles determine which issues are seen as security relevant and how they should be solved? In particular, under which knowledge-based conditions will the public accept a security problem to be solved?
- What factors on the level of culture (including aspects of communication and culture) bring subjective security away from – and possibly back to – actual security?
- How do culturally embedded norms affect countries’ approaches to the development of solutions to security problems?
- How can steps towards a differential analysis of European security culture be taken? This concerns the identification of groups of European Union member states and their societies that share similarities in terms of security culture, e.g. in the relationship between human/citizen security and national/state security. An important aspect is the elaboration of differences in security perceptions and needs in different European nations with different public policy and citizen security cultures.
- What culturally rooted paths for change from actual to perceived security can be identified, contributing to the vertices of a catalogue of differences between actual and perceived security?
- What are typical cultural predictors for the success of interventions to enhance citizen security? In particular, what does culture analysis tell us about effectiveness criteria for security technologies, in particular about guidelines and criteria which security technologies and interventions need to meet in order to be effective and reinvigorated, as opposed to refuted or obstructed by citizens?
- What does culture analysis tell us about guidelines to communicate risk to the public, avoiding gaps between actual and perceived security?

As mentioned above, these leading questions and the related research reported here are founded on a cognitive concept of culture. This concept also assumes that citizens’ personal assessments of the security situation in their urban neighbourhood are a complex construction and cannot be reduced to individual stories of victimization or to alleged key drivers as usually covered in opinion poll items such as “feeling safe/unsafe when walking in dark”. Similarly, public

<sup>9</sup> Karl Drake, “Orienting dispositions in the perception of risk: An analysis of contemporary worldviews and cultural biases,” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 22, no. 1 (1991): 61-82.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic, “The role of affect and worldviews as orienting dispositions in the perception and acceptance of nuclear power,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 26 (1996): 1427-1453.

communication and the formation of public opinion about risk should be seen as results of socially negotiated and constructed sense-making that takes place in cultural contexts.<sup>11</sup>

However, the cultural perspective – also on the level of a theory of risk – has not remained uncontested. This is in particular because it typically lacks empirical substantiation. Other concepts, as for example applied in urbanization studies, strongly argue that differences between actual and perceived security are mainly media constructs, especially the salience media assign to crime incidents so to grasp public fear and catch attention for their product. Referring to studies in the UK, readers of boulevard newspapers (“tabloids”) have twice the probability to exhibit specific fear of crime (violence, burglary and car crime) than readers of quality press (“broadsheets”).<sup>12</sup> This assumption nevertheless deserves contextualization, for which culture also appears to be a relevant dimension. In fact, readers of tabloids arguably belong to different social strata by trend than readers of higher quality press, and may be confronted with more difficult realities. Therefore, empirical results of this kind should be complemented by an analysis of the social, if not cultural context.

To account for both trains of thought, the specific approach that CPSI uses in the analysis of cultural factors is applied to two levels of aggregation: the *government/public policy level* and the *citizen level*.

Important to notice, also at the level of the government, the experience of security in subjective terms, often termed cultural selection of risks, is worth analyzing. National research programmes for civil security are used as indices for that cultural selection of risk. National security programmes have also proven to provide a sound foundation for the elaboration of differences in security perceptions and needs in different European cultures.

Political factors guiding security interventions, even beyond typical political culture, are often associated with cultural factors and imply subjectivity, just as do citizens’ perceptions:

- national perception styles determine which issues are seen as security relevant and where legislation and/or development of national capabilities and intervention strategies to meet challenges is necessary;
- culturally embedded norms affect countries’ approaches to the development of security solutions (national, pooled or common European capabilities);
- culturally rooted values attached to the concept of the nation state determine to which extent national research policy is open to international standardization or is in contrast concentrated on national coordination of relevant domestic bodies and agencies.

Appreciating this fact that is often overlooked by studies of security and risk perception and by relevant cultural approaches to the CPSI subject area, like cultural criminology (which as mentioned above mainly operate at a sub-culture level), this report at first provides an analysis of *national policy-related cultural factors* which are associated with the following status and gaps in national governance of security interventions. The identification of these is among the findings of previous analyses undertaken in the framework of CPSI and activity in ESRIF WG 10 based on CPSI results:

- Maintaining European security is complex and requires a comprehensive approach both at national and European level.
- EU Member States’ governments do not have a comparable set of security strategies or priorities to adequately address the current security challenges Europe faces.
- National security research and foresight activities are not adequately coordinated with the European-level research programs resulting in gaps and overlap between (and potential duplication of) activities.

<sup>11</sup> Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide, “Multicultural Crisis Communication: Towards a Social Constructionist Perspective,” *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 14, no. 4 (2006): 180-189.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements* 2007. London: Earthscan 2007  
<<http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=2432&alt=1>>, ch. 3.

- There is a split in approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardization) and a majority focus on technical solutions to security problems.

The related analysis was based on strategic evidence provided by civil security research programmes. This follows the adaptation of new methodological developments of the strategic culture approach from international relations theory.<sup>13</sup> These new developments centre on textual analysis to identify security cultures.<sup>14</sup> This goes back to classical concepts of identifying “cognitive templates” for the perception of experience and its value-based incorporation into long-term strategies by an analysis of “policy paradigms”.<sup>15</sup> The policy paradigms used in the present study are national security and security research strategies.

Nevertheless, as noted by several critical reviews, a considerable shortcoming of the state of the art of the cultural analysis of risk and security is that it either lacks empirical evidence or stays at the level of citizens’ perceptions, not accounting for descriptors of security culture on a national level; in addition, the lack of cross-national comparisons of cultural accounts of risk and security perceptions has been criticised.<sup>16</sup> CPSI cultural analysis seeks to advance the state of the art in both respects. This report therefore consists of two main parts, its second part including *empirical analysis of citizen security culture*, as opposed to the public policy security culture covered in the first part:

- The results of the analysis of national cultural factors associated with gaps in the governance of security interventions, identifying soft factors for more efficient government and EU approaches to enhancing citizen security. This is an important contribution to the whole project, as CPSI is about changing perceptions both of security and of interventions, and this second aspect goes beyond studies such as of victimology and political culture on the level of citizen surveys. It needs macro-level cultural analysis such as strategic culture and selection of risks.
- The results of the comparative analysis of national (public) security cultures, based on qualitative interpretation of empirical findings from desk research.

The two parts of the analysis interlink: Together with empirical public security culture research, a cultural analysis of national security research programmes following the *four big cultural factors model* developed by the CEUSS | Center for European Security Studies for CPSI allows us to determine knowledge-based conditions under which the public will accept a security problem to be solved. The emphasis of knowledge as key factor in what determines the way people perceive, define and assess insecurity corresponds to recent developments in risk analysis.<sup>17</sup>

In its appendix, this report contains the following data sheets on which the cultural analysis was based; they may be used by those who want to reproduce results or use CPSI cultural data in their own work:

- Appendix A: Analytical matrix sheet (nation coding) for the four big cultural factors model
- Appendix B: Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions: A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis
- Appendix C: Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security: Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level

<sup>13</sup> Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 87-113.

<sup>14</sup> See in particular Monica Gariup, *European Security Culture. Language, Theory, Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

<sup>16</sup> See Sigve Olteidal, Bjørg-Elin Moen, Hroar Klempe and Torbjørn Rundmo, *Explaining Risk Perception. An Evaluation of Cultural Theory*. Trondheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Psychology, 2004 <[http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Cultural\\_theory.pdf](http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Cultural_theory.pdf)>.

<sup>17</sup> S.M. Macgill/Y.L. Siu, “A new paradigm for risk analysis,” *Futures* 37 (2005), 1105-1131.

In general, country cases undertaken in CPSI WP 4.4 comprise the countries represented in the End-user Advisory Group, which are Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. However, at the time of the collection of data for the national comparative analysis (Spring 2008), based on the cultural selection of risk method and requiring the presence of national security strategies/research programmes, the case of Bulgaria could not be covered by an approved respective document. To have a systematic selection scheme, all participating countries in the EU 7th Framework Programme that had a national specific security research programme in place at that time were covered, therefore this sector of CPSI cultural analysis includes Norway.

Work on defining culture-sensitive media-strategies for threat/security situation communication and public awareness-raising in order to close gaps between actual and perceived security depends on the progression of analyses under WP 2.3 and will mainly be conducted jointly with University of Kent in the context of public opinion analysis. Results will be included in WP 2.3 deliveries and in the CPSI final report. However, the present report additionally includes a short report on cultural factors in risk communication and indicative findings for appropriate media strategies gained from cultural analysis as conducted on the level of public policy and of citizen security culture.

Results covered in the present report will feed into elaborated country case studies within further work under CPSI WP 4.4 also considering upcoming findings from WP 2.3. CPSI WP 4.4 research results and data will inform CPSI WP 5.2 (qualitative analysis), which includes a morphological model comparing a number of national security trends for different EU countries, based on data from a national typology of citizen security developed by WP 4.4 (cultural analysis). CPSI WP 4.4 empirical cultural data and derived hypotheses will in addition serve as material for external validation purposes within other WP 4 tasks and sub-packages.

## 2 Methodology

The CPSI conceptual model and methodology, including the data warehouse, aim to support general conclusions about citizens' fear of crime in relation to actual security and to contribute to an efficiency scheme for designing and assessing interventions and which work best in which settings. A considerable part of the validation of the CPSI model takes place on the local level, based on testing and refining hypotheses gained from literature and morphological analysis in citizen surveys. CPSI WP 4.4 work is dedicated to the other part of validation and data collection, applying a macroanalytical approach and developing a framework for assessing national security cultures.

As explained in the preceding chapter, this macroanalytical cultural analysis is performed on two levels: the government or public policy level and the citizen level. The general assumption of cultural approaches to the perception of (in)security is that things such as fear of crime depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk. They are thus seen by cultural approaches more as an indicator of the collective memory of particular events as shaped by political response, media framing etc. than of citizens' actual security beliefs/perceptions.

The methodology applied to the *government/public policy level of analysis* rests on the "cultural theory of risk".<sup>18</sup> This theory assumes that different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews: conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are selected as important because this reinforces established interpretations and relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community. Among other "texts" and "artefacts", security research programmes can therefore be taken as an indicator of security cultures.

The subsequent investigation of cultural factors in this sense rests on a theoretically based differentiation between four groups of such factors (values, knowledge, symbols and repertoires of action) following the four-factor model developed in CPSI (described in the next chapter), adding to the cultural theory of risk and providing it with a frame of reference for empirical analysis. The model provides a qualitative analytical framework to identify and make comparable the cognitive foundations for a society's knowledge management and attitudes in respect of security issues.

Together with empirical public security culture research (secondary analysis of EUROBAROMETER and victimological survey data), this framework as exemplified by a cultural analysis of national security research programmes allows us to determine knowledge-based conditions under which the public will accept a security problem to be solved.

The analysis is conducted on a country basis, considering the countries covered in precedent CPSI and ESRIF WG 10 work: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK. These countries were selected as being those EU Member States countries participating in the EU 7th Framework Programme which have national security research programmes in place:

- Austria: National security research programme "KIRAS"<sup>19</sup>
- France: "Appels à projets 2008: Concepts Systèmes et Outils pour la Sécurité Globale"<sup>20</sup>
- Germany: "Research for Civil Security. Programme of the German Federal Government"<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See especially Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture*. Berkeley, CA et al.: University of California Press, 1982.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.kiras.at>; see also: Security Research. Austria Innovativ, Special Edition, no. 3a/2008 <[http://www.kiras.at/cms/fileadmin/dateien/allgemein/Security\\_Research\\_2.pdf](http://www.kiras.at/cms/fileadmin/dateien/allgemein/Security_Research_2.pdf)>.

<sup>20</sup> Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Appels à projets 2008: Concepts Systèmes et Outils pour la Sécurité Globale <<http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/?NodId=17&IngAAPIId=188>>.

- Italy: “The Italian Civil Protection National Service”<sup>22</sup>
- Netherlands: “National Security. Strategy and Work programme 2007-2008”<sup>23</sup>
- Norway: “National Guidelines on Information Security 2007-2010”<sup>24</sup>
- Spain: “The Spanish National Plan for Scientific Research, Development and Technological Innovation 2008-2011”<sup>25</sup>
- Sweden: “Knowledge to safeguard security. Proposals for a national strategy for security research”<sup>26</sup>
- United Kingdom: “The United Kingdom Security & Counter-Terrorism Science & Innovation Strategy”<sup>27</sup>

A textual analysis of the countries’ security research programmes has been performed as a joint CPSI-ESRIF WG 10 activity,<sup>28</sup> it belongs to CPSI research in WP 4.4 and its results are referred to in this deliverable, which however does not duplicate the analysis.

In a follow-on step, the country-related results were aggregated so to gain insight on the general relevance of each of the four groups/models of cultural factors in respect of understanding splits between subjective and objective security, as well as overcoming gaps and meeting needs for coordination in security-enhancing interventions. The empirical results are listed in detail in the *Analytical matrix sheet* (Appendix A).

Representing the second part of inquiry into cultural factors in the perception of (in)security, analysis on the *citizen level* is necessary for two reasons. First, following classical accounts, it continues to be regarded as a seminal ingredient of social science analysis of political culture but has found to be subject to change rather than a reified expression of the national character.<sup>29</sup> Political culture research thus has been found in being of more empirical underpinning. However, typically based on survey data, this type of analysis usually stops short of structured cross-national comparisons and identifying general factors, instead rather describing national peculiarities as such, without placing them in context. In order to move beyond these limitations, our analysis aims to identify types of citizen security cultures on a comparative basis, based on a secondary analysis of social and victimological survey data which have not been looked at in a comprehensive way before. Rather, cultural accounts of criminology have concentrated on identifying stylized frameworks and cultural space for dealing with citizen security politically.<sup>30</sup> These are though

21 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Research for Civil Security. Programme of the German Federal Government. Bonn/Berlin 2007 <[http://www.bmbf.de/pub/research\\_for\\_civil\\_security\\_.pdf](http://www.bmbf.de/pub/research_for_civil_security_.pdf)>

22 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, The Italian Civil Protection National Service <[http://www.protezionecivile.it/cms/attach/brochuredpc\\_eng2.pdf](http://www.protezionecivile.it/cms/attach/brochuredpc_eng2.pdf)>. This is not a security research programme document in its own, but it contains relevant information on how civil protection is based on technically scientific insight and seeks to engage with scientific research.

23 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Security. Strategy and Work Programme 2007-2008. The Hague, May 2007 <<http://www.minbzk.nl/aspx/download.aspx?file=/contents/pages/88474/natveiligh.bwdef.pdf>>.

24 Information Security Coordination Council (Koordineringsutvalget for forebyggende informasjonsikkerhet, KIS), National Guidelines on Information Security 2007-2010. Inofficial translation. [Oslo: December 2007] <<http://www.nsm.stat.no/Documents/KIS/Publikasjoner/National%20Guidelines%20on%20Information%20Security%202007-2010.pdf>>.

25 Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología, The Spanish National Plan for Scientific Research, Development and Technological Innovation 2008-2011 <[http://www.plannacionalidi.es/documentos/Plan\\_ingles\\_web.pdf](http://www.plannacionalidi.es/documentos/Plan_ingles_web.pdf)>.

26 VINNOVA – Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems, Swedish Emergency Management Agency, Swedish Armed Forces, Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, Swedish Defence Research Agency and Swedish National Defence College & Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Knowledge to Safeguard Security. Proposals for a National Strategy for Security Research. June 2005 <<http://www.vinnova.se/upload/EPIStorePDF/vp-05-03.pdf>>.

27 Home Office, Office for Security & Counter-Terrorism, The Counter-Terrorism Science Unit, The United Kingdom Security & Counter-Terrorism Science & Innovation Strategy. London 2007 <<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/science-innovation-strategy1?view=Binary>>.

28 “European Countries National Security Research Policy Compared in the Light of FP 7” (fn 3).

29 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston/MA and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980.

30 Cf. Ferrell, “Cultural Criminology” (fn 3).

factors that should be addressed on the level of government/public policy, as done in CPSI based on evidence from national security (research) strategies.

Second, cultural analysis on the citizen level is necessary in order to link up to other relevant parts of CPSI research which focuses on the communal level of citizens' perception of (in)security. Cultural data and typifications as produced in WP 4.4 are intended to serve as external validation for the conceptual model and original survey research about perceived security as conducted in WP 4.2. Whereas this work is intended to test hypotheses gained from literature and morphological analysis, WP 4.4 encompasses the development of testable hypotheses for further research, beyond the focus on fear of crime, as foreseen in the CPSI description of work.

Cultural issues on the citizen level as reported in this deliverable are based on the method of "qualitative empirical" analysis.<sup>31</sup> This work rests on two data sheets produced in WP 4.4 and available in Appendix B and Appendix C to this report. They present a sum-up and secondary statistical analysis as well as qualitative interpretation of empirical criminological statistical findings (based on indicators testable by means of opinion polls and interviews) associated with felt vs. actual security and factors causing feeling of insecurity, as exemplified by fear of crime. In addition, testable hypotheses for further empirical work in the CPSI public opinion work package and for the validation study are derived. These hypotheses cover "causes of fear of crime" (also in relation to actual security) and "social effectiveness criteria for security technologies" (with CCTV as example).

In recent criminological studies, fear of crime usually is only investigated on the level of the population of selected European capitals investigated in a more differentiated way, and accordingly operationalized by items related to urban-area security (see the review results in Appendix C). Moreover, most criminological research is at least three to four years time-lagged and does not cover research into public belief in effectiveness of interventions. As it belongs to CPSI's approach to include citizens' perceptions of interventions and to generate hypotheses on a general level and then test them in our own from-scratch case studies, the available criminological public opinion research is of limited use for the scope of the project. Nevertheless, there are a couple of criminological resources that offer relevant data for analysing fear of crime in comparative terms on a national level. In order to generate hypotheses for further research by an inductive methodology, desk research on the basis of the relevant items of the Standard EUROBAROMETER has proven useful to develop, on national levels, hypotheses about associations between factors believed to impact fear of crime and to establish an empirically sound foundation for both cross-country and cross-time comparison.

Related data are collected, analyzed and testable hypotheses are developed in the *Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level* (Appendix C).

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<sup>31</sup> The methodology follows Detlef Garz and Klaus Kraimer, *Qualitativ-empirische Sozialforschung. Konzepte, Methoden, Analysen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991.

### 3 National cultural factors associated with gaps in the governance of security interventions – Soft factors for more efficient government and EU approaches to enhancing citizen security

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#### 3.1 Four models of cultural factors in security perceptions and interventions: values, knowledge, symbols and repertoires of action

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Social science approaches to cultural factors in political processes typically assume that culture is not a factor strong enough to explain similarities between countries that have strong structural differences, such as constitutional foundations, political systems and systems of government. Culture is rather seen as a factor that explains why countries that have certain structural factors in common still behave differently or why countries react differently to the same structural forces they are exposed to (such as international terrorism, IT security threats or the need for common security capabilities). An illustrating example is the question of why countries that follow society-centred security research programmes focused on prevention have different approaches to coordinating their national approach to counterterrorism with the EU strategy or follow different definitions of terrorism.

There are four different understandings of cultural factors in politics and policy (such as security research policy) development. These trains of thought represent models from the broader field of cultural analysis in political science and have been successfully applied to analysis in the framework of “strategic culture” research. In fact, the most substantial contribution to a cultural approach to comparison of national security strategies comes from this field of strategic studies. The basic structure of that approach can be per analogism transferred to grasp cultural determinants of security research governance, definition of security research themes and potential for European coordination present in EU Member States. The present analysis thus carries strategic culture analysis further to grasp the whole of the thematic spectrum of security research in Europe.

A (chronologically) first school of thought (*model I*) understands culture as the ideational representation of foundational decisions about basic *normative values* (e.g. democracy, European integration, justice liberty and security), which shape the normative arena in which political decisions then take place. Seminal authors are Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba.<sup>32</sup> For example, a certain normative concept of civil society present in an EU Member State may prevent that state from participation in international security (research) coordination, especially in the field of technical solutions to security problems, because this runs counter to that state’s conception of liberty and self-determination of its people.

A second school of thought (*model II*) sees cultural factors as *cognitive forms* by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meaning to facts as well as save and reproduce *knowledge* and their *interpretation* of the world. A seminal author is Clifford Geertz.<sup>33</sup> This concept may be especially useful explaining the variety of research themes present in EU Member States security research programmes and the interpretation of cultural factors as part of the security problem vs. part of the solution. For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalization processes that mount up to threats to internal security (such as in France or the Netherlands); differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security offences (as it is the case in Sweden).

A third school of thought (*model III*) conceives of culture as *common symbols* of a (national or even transnational) community to which members of a society orient their action and which are a

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<sup>32</sup> Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1963.

<sup>33</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

kind of software for operating interfaces between actors (e.g. EU Member States) and overarching structures (i.e. European institutions for security research coordination and governance). The cultural key to the functioning of such interfaces is seen as a system of symbols that is flexible enough to reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges. A seminal author is Robert Wuthnow.<sup>34</sup> For example, a country that has a security culture centred on prevention and foresight as the symbol for security will have normative difficulty to engage in security research coordination centred on intervention (response/reaction) and to accept topics such as civil protection as elements of a European security (research) agenda.

A fourth school (*model IV*) conceives of culture as *action repertoires*, that is, individual (or proprietary) experience-based strategies associated with individual attributions of meaning and normative convictions. This concept is strong in explaining how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies and courses of action being allotted to defined goals. A seminal author is Ann Swidler.<sup>35</sup> Applied to security research governance analysis, cultural factors defined in terms of action repertoires may best explain why EU Member States adapt differently to similar security threats and may also implement commonly defined security capabilities plans and research coordination strategies in divergent ways. Coordination for example may be implemented by Europeanization (development of or adherence to common standards on the EU level) or by a national joint interagency approach.

These four approaches/models can be classified along two axes, as shown in the subsequent Table 3.1 :

Culture as a factor in the perception/definition of threat

vs.

Culture as a factor in the response to threat.

and

Cultural factors influencing the thematic thrust of national security research programmes (e.g. prevention/preparedness vs. reaction/response; technology vs. society)

vs.

Cultural factors influencing the national approach to security (research) governance (e.g. national inter-agency coordination vs. international standardization).

	<b>Culture as a factor in the perception/definition of threat</b>	<b>Culture as a factor in the response to threat</b>
<b>Cultural factors influencing the thematic thrust of national security research programmes</b>  (e.g. prevention/preparedness vs. reaction/response; technology vs. society)	<i>Model II / Knowledge and interpretation</i>  Development of shared understanding of the concept of security; cognitive construction of a common European security space; overcoming traditional national interpretations and courses of action through the development of common concepts and knowledge  Example: <i>Explanation for the variety of research themes present in EU Member States' security research programmes and the interpretation of cultural factors as part</i>	<i>Model IV / Action repertoires</i>  Reduction of complexity to available individual/proprietary, experience-based strategies; attempt to make national strategies international standards; divergent national responses to same structural pressures; problem of harmonization of national implementation actions  Example: <i>Explains why EU Member States adapt differently to similar security threats and also may implement commonly</i>

<sup>34</sup> Robert Wuthnow et al., *Cultural Analysis. The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas*. Boston, MA et al.: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1984.

<sup>35</sup> Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 273-286.

	<p><i>of the security problem vs. part of the solution. For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalization processes that mount up to threats to internal security (such as in France or the Netherlands); differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security offences (as it is the case in Sweden).</i></p>	<p><i>defined security capabilities plans and research coordination strategies in divergent ways. Standardisation for example might be implemented by Europeanization (development of or adherence to common standards on the EU level) or by a national joined-up approach of interagency coordination</i></p>
<p><b>Cultural factors influencing the national approach to security (research) governance</b>  (e.g. national inter-agency coordination vs. international standardization)</p>	<p><i>Model III / Common symbols</i></p> <p>Ideas and habits defining national characteristics of security and governing threat perception; explanation of formation of action repertoires as assumed as independent variable in model IV</p> <p>Example: <i>A country that has a security culture centred on prevention and foresight as the symbol for security will have normative difficulty to engage in security research coordination centred on response/reaction and to accept topics such as civil protection as elements of a European security (research) agenda.</i></p>	<p><i>Model I / Normative values</i></p> <p>Focus on institutional foundations that provide values on which decision-making is based: Deriving common values from coordinated threat assessments and common security capability plans; development of a common European security identity along with standardization and certification of security solutions</p> <p>Problem: May lead to the development of separate national values and themes for national security research (coordination) and for European security research (coordination)</p> <p>Example: <i>A certain normative concept of civil society present in a EU Member State may prevent that state from participation in international security (research) coordination, especially in the field of technical solutions to security problems, because this runs counter to that state's conception of liberty and self-determination of its people.</i></p>

**Table 3.1: Four models of analysis of cultural factors and examples from the field of security research governance**

Findings have revealed the following gaps and need for coordination, for which the relevance of cultural factors was explored:

- Building potential for a comprehensive approach at the national level
- Building potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level
- Overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardization), including the improvement of coordination of national security research and foresight activities with European-level research programmes

- Overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour technological solutions to security problems)

### 3.2 Assignment of evidence for each of the four big cultural factors (models I-IV) per country to the four identified gaps/challenges

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In *Matrix 1* of the *Analytical sheet* (Appendix A to this report), these identified gaps and coordination issues are associated with cultural factors according to the four models identified above. Within each model, evidence for each of the four big cultural factors (model I-IV) per country is assigned the four identified gaps/challenges listed on a country basis. This country-related information comes from the precedent comparative country analysis reported in the “Mid-term Threats and Challenges” paper as well as from preliminary results of the collaborative project “Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions” (CPSI) from the FP7-SEC-2007-1 call itself.

“+” in front of an entry in *Matrix 1* means that the respective political/structural/cultural factor is conducive to meeting the respective challenge/narrowing the respective gap.

“-” in front of an entry in *Matrix 1* means that the respective political/structural/cultural factor can be expected to exacerbate the respective challenge/broaden the respective gap.

The matrix can form a basis only for tentative results, as the present empirical material does not allow for making assignments for all countries in every box. However, as the subsequent analysis is based on an aggregation of country entries in the matrix, the results can be expected to be sufficiently reliable to make statements about the aggregated effects of each of the four big cultural factors (according to model I-IV). We can determine by that method to what extent a cultural factor accounts for the existence of a gap or coordination issue or for the overcoming of such a gap or coordination issue. Put differently, we can provide an answer to the question if the respective cultural factor is part of the problem or part of the solution, or of both – as we will see will also be the case.

To approach this question, *Matrix 2* produces an overall assessment of evidence for the four big cultural factors, integrating the country-related “+/-”-entries from *Matrix 1* above. In the left four columns of *Matrix 2*, in each box the countries that have “+” entries for the respective gap and cultural factor in *Matrix 1* (meaning that there is evidence that in this country, the respective cultural factor can be expected to help close the gap/solve the coordination issue) are listed. In the right four columns, the countries that have “-”-entries (meaning a negative effect of the respective cultural factor on the respective gap) are listed.

The number of listed countries is then counted per line (per gap), and counted in sum in the last line of *Matrix 2*.

The most visible result is that *model II (knowledge/interpretation)* has most evidence for both favourable and adverse effects on the identified gaps, except one case both per gap and in sum. Ability (or lack thereof) to develop a shared understanding of the concept of security, to overcome traditional national interpretations and frameworks for assessing security problems and solutions, and the existence (or lack) of a political cognitive construction (conceptual frame of reference) of a common European security space is the strongest political/structural/cultural factor that explains for a country the:

- potential (negative and positive) for a comprehensive approach at the national level
- lack of potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level
- success or failure in overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardization), including the improvement of coordination of national security research and foresight activities with European-level research programmes
- success or failure in overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour technological solutions to security problems

These findings support the assumption that the development of a shared understanding of the concept of security is generally at the core of security governance and coordination. However, it not only means that structural divergences between EU Member States (such as different modes of research governance or different thematic thrusts and implementation perspective – e.g. technological vs. social solutions to security problems) can be overcome by shared meaning. It also means that security research governance and coordination founded on structural similarities can be disrupted by lack of a shared understanding of the concept of security or, for example, different strategies to give political meaning to technical questions of security.

Only as far as positive potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level is concerned, more evidence was found for *model IV (action repertoires)*. This suggests that common (or at least compatible) practices of cooperation of a group of countries can lead to a harmonization and Europeanization of security research policies even when no shared understanding of the concept of security and no common interpretation of security threats and challenges exists.

Model IV (action repertoires) is at the same time the only model with a majority of evidence for positive effects on gaps and coordination issues, whereas all the other models (normative values, knowledge and interpretation, common symbols) are in sum associated with evidence for the negative effects of the cultural factors which they assume.

The second noticeable result therefore is that in *the majority of the gaps and coordination issues identified, cultural factors are a part of the problem*: they for the most part account for the existence and widening of gaps and for lack of coordination.

This was found to be the case for

- lack of potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level
- failure in overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardization), including the improvement of coordination of national security research and foresight activities with European-level research programmes
- failure in overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour technological solutions to security problems)

Just as remarkably, there is one sector of gaps/coordination issues in which *cultural factors are – on an aggregated level – a part of the solution*, helping to narrow gaps and solve coordination issues: the development of a *comprehensive approach to security research (governance) at the national level*.

### 3.3 Country-related findings<sup>36</sup>

*Germany* is the case in which cultural factors in sum have the by far most negative impact on managing security (research) governance gaps/challenges. *Italy* and *Sweden* are the countries in which cultural factors have the most positive impact. In the case of *France*, summarized cultural factors impact is neutral. See *Matrix 3* and *Matrix 4* of the *Analytical sheet* (Appendix A to this report) for the results behind this country sum-up.

The *Netherlands* and *Norway* are cases where cultural factors according to *model II (knowledge/interpretation)* best account for both reduction and production of the identified gaps, thus both countries best represent the aggregated results noted above. In the political culture of the Netherlands, security is interpreted as a task situated at the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders. This limits the scope for Europeanization, but at the same time, Dutch security research is guided by the interpretation of security as a sector that requires an

<sup>36</sup> The underlying empirical evidence, as explained in Chapter 3, is contained (a) in the textual analysis of the countries' security research programmes, performed as a joint CPSI-ESRIF WG 10 activity (see fn 28), it belongs to CPSI research in WP 4.4 and its results are referred to in this deliverable, which however does not duplicate the analysis; (b) in the *Analytical matrix sheet* in Appendix A.

alignment of the national approach with that of other states and organizations. In Norway, the interpretation of security as information security is prevailing, which limits the scope of the country's research approach, but on the other hand, there is the political interpretation that solutions to (information) security problems need to rest on international standards/standardization. Norway follows a multidimensional, multifunctional approach – not only confronting threats to citizens and infrastructure but threats to values of the nation, from democracy, health and territorial integrity up to economic security and cultural values. On the other hand, Norway's interpretation of security follows strictly the concept of internal security of the "rikt" (kingdom). Therefore, in both the Netherlands and Norway, political/cultural factors positively affect compatibility of national security strategies or priorities with challenges and (search for) solutions present at the European/international level. At the same time, they limit the scope for defining common European themes for security research.

*Italy, Sweden and the UK* were found to make up for a common case in which cultural factors in sum have positive effects (which is also the case in the Netherlands). Additionally, in these three countries, factors according to *model II (knowledge/interpretation)* – as just discussed for Norway and the Netherlands for their negative impact – clearly have a positive main effect. They reduce divergences in the national security strategies, provide scope for a comprehensive approach both at the national and the European level and for reconciling split approaches to security governance in the context of a shared understanding of the concept of security. This is mainly due to these countries' culture of network-based approaches to security-policy making (including comprehensive knowledge management with input from different sectors of politics and society). There are accordingly national preferences for network-type solutions to security threats, technological exchange and exchange of security information at a national level – and also at an international level, at least as information referring to developing standards or "security labels" is concerned. For example, Italy has the public perception of internal security and public safety as national tasks, at the same time political culture is open towards a Europeanization of the security sector due to long experience with internationally acting organized crime.

At the same time, cultural factors according to *model I (normative values)* were found to account for amplification of gaps in two (Sweden and UK) of these three countries. This is a case where value-based approaches to security do not reinforce a common European idea of security research but lead to the development of separate national thematic references for security research (coordination). It could be argued that Sweden and the UK are countries in which questions about public opinion and policy framed as security questions are very closely related to the normative foundations of statehood, reflecting threats to the idea of the state as a collective security provider (Sweden: Integration of information from different sources for first-responder emergency actions; UK: Responding to citizens' fear of conventional crime/violence and terrorist attacks). This results in a predominance of national themes, however mirrored by an interest in implementing these themes along with emerging European/international standards, as well as making use of international knowledge and practices.

*Austria and Spain* represent cases in which the effect of *model-I* and *model-II* cultural factors is just the opposite – and in which cultural factors in sum have a negative effect on security (research) governance. *Normative values* were found to contribute to reducing gaps, as both countries have a public culture that fosters the idea of making public choices on the basis of pluralistic assessments and with a view to the functioning of the social/political system as a whole. Styles of developing *knowledge and interpretation* (giving political meaning to facts) were found to have in sum an amplifying effect on gaps in both countries. In Austria, the tradition and structure of "consocialism" and consensus democracy limits the potential for developing shared European understandings on security problems and agree on a common interpretation of the value/seriousness of security challenges; the interpretation of security as a task at the level of the state organization as a whole limits the development of internationally comparable security strategies. It can also be expected to limit the social acceptance of international solutions for security problems, not (re-)designed to national needs. In Spain, the normative ideal of security

based on and contributing to innovation does not open up space for a promotion of comprehensive international solutions and convergence of security (research) strategies, as it is mainly interpreted in national terms of science and technology. At the same time, Spain typically uses EU institutions to promote its own agenda and to seek support for own positions. This tendency is, however, limited by mistrust of other security cultures rooted in the country's political culture, which is marked by an aversion to "security", resulting from remembrances of a repressive security state in charge of public order.

*France and Germany* are cases in which *model-III* cultural factors (*symbolism and associated practices*) were found to reduce gaps. National characteristics of security lead to the perception of security problems as having a generically transnational and international character. Security is at the same time seen as a symbol of preserving the values acquired by the society as a whole. In France, security has become a symbol for crisis management in a broad sense, irrespective of what originally caused a specific security incident. In Germany, security has become a symbol of preparedness and ability to defend the nation against threats from without and from within. Both need additional legitimacy from higher-ranking, international values, such as democracy, rule of law and European integration. This background of political culture explains the potential for establishing comparability between national and European security strategies and call for a more comprehensive approach on a European level. It however needs to be added that in the case of Germany, model-III cultural factors were also found to have exacerbating effects on gaps. This has to be understood in the first place as an effect of the German idea of a protective state (in the wake of the enlightened-absolutist public policy tradition of "gute polizey" in the 18th century), responsive to the specific security requirements of its citizens.

*Model-II* cultural factors, relating to *knowledge structures* and styles of *interpretation*, were found in France and Germany to – in sum – cause/widen gaps, just as they were in Austria and Spain. France's "sûreté" tradition/culture e.g. causes an overemphasis on the societal (as opposed to the technical) dimension, thus limiting potential for convergence of security research on a European level and causing incompatibility with the majority of national and European security (research) strategies with their focus on technical solutions to security problems. Germany's interpretation of security as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole/as a government matter in the sense of civil protection sets constraints on a comprehensive approach both on a national and on a European level. It also limits acceptability of coordination with other national and European-level research programmes, or at least the perception of such coordination as useful for solutions to security problems on a national scale.

Table 3.2 presents a content-related summary of findings, whereas

Table 3.3 presents a formal summary of the country-related findings. The coding follows Appendix A: *Analytical matrix sheet (nation coding) for the four big cultural factors model*.

<b>UK</b>	Inter-agency joined-up approach is a normative value, based on experience with administration in commonwealth and multiculturalism affairs	Combating terrorism is interpreted as a comprehensive task, including politics, public, technology, applied sciences and academia	Homeland security symbolism favours science and technology cooperation and critical infrastructure protection	Commonwealth tradition facilitates sharing of experience and solutions with international partners
<b>Spain</b>	Normative idea of national innovation by dedicating research to cross-cutting themes	Security (research) mainly interpreted in terms of science and technology	Very different concepts of security with different connotations (Franco's repressive security state in charge of public order hinders a streamlining)	
<b>Sweden</b>	Establishing international linkages, but mainly in order to support industry participation in foreign (mainly U.S.) security research programmes	National security research is understood as an instrument for improving conditions for participating in the EU's security research programme		
<b>Norway</b>	Culture of security (prevention) in the sector of critical information and communication technology is a leading value for security (research) policy making	Security commonly interpreted as information security	Critical information and communication infrastructure as a cultural symbol of national security	Nurturing a culture of security in the sector of critical information and communication technology
<b>Netherlands</b>	Normative conviction that security is an all-societal affair and must rest on contributions from the national government, local governments, the business community, social organizations and citizens.	Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders		Practice of networking, establishment of international security networks and deems the national approach to be aligned of that of other nations and organizations
<b>Italy</b>	Political norm of comprehensive risk assessment and management	Cognitive approach directed at comprehensive risk information and assessment, involving international import and export of scientific (technological) knowledge	Internal security and public safety as national tasks, at the same time political culture is open towards an Europeanization of the security sector due to long experience with inter-nationally acting organized crime	Practical concern with organized crime promotes electronic surveillance/concentration on technological solutions
<b>Germany</b>	Technical understanding of security and culture of security centred on the norm of preserving state functioning and protecting market economy	Academic approach to security research, centred on the technological science dimension, limits thematic scope	Security as defence (Cold-war front state threat from outside and extremist threat from within)	Cold war front state legacy leads to an over-emphasis of civil protection practices on Bundesländer level
<b>France</b>	Sûreté tradition supports a balance between internal and international dimension	Sûreté tradition causes on overemphasis on the societal (as opposed to the technical) dimension	Security as a symbol for crisis management in a broad sense, independent from the source of origin	Practice of involvement in international mechanisms as an opportunity to develop knowledge of global trends/approaches
<b>Austria</b>	"comprehensive national defence" as a tradition and legal provision	Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy increases potential for pluralistic analysis	Security is seen as a national symbol	Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy increases potential for national coordination
	<b>Normative values</b>	<b>Knowledge &amp; interpretation</b>	<b>Common symbols</b>	<b>Action repertoires</b>

Table 3.2: Cultural issues surrounding the gaps and challenges identified – summary of national findings

XX = Strength of evidence (biggest is modal score)

X = related factors prevent/reduce gap

x = related factors reinforce/maintain gap

blue, pink, orange and brown = Country groupings according to similar X/x constellation

	Austria	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	Spain	UK
Normative values	X	X	x	x	x	x	X	X	X
Knowledge & interpretation	X	X	X	X	XX	XX	X	X	X
Common symbols	X	X	X	x		x		X	
Action repertoires	X		X	XX	x	x	x	x	X

**Table 3.3: Cultural factors and their effects on the identified gaps/needs for coordination of security-enhancing interventions**

### 3.4 Association of the four cultural factors with identified gaps/challenges in respect of security-enhancing interventions

Summarized across all countries analysed (see *Matrix 4* in Appendix A), cultural factors have the strongest evidence of positive impact on (developing) a comprehensive approach at the national level; they have the strongest evidence of negative impact on splits in thematic thrust (such as society vs. technology-centred security research). They have almost neutral impact on (developing) a comprehensive approach to citizen security-enhancing interventions at the European level. Table 3.4 illustrates these findings, the coding again following *Matrix 1* of Appendix A to this report.

+ = positive (part of solution), - = negative (part of problem), 0 = neutral evidence of summarized impact of all four cultural factors on type of gap

	Austria	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	Spain	UK	Sum
Comprehensive approach at national level	+	+	-	+	+	-	0	-	+	++
Comprehensive approach at European level	0	0	-	+	0	0	0	0	-	-
Lack of comparable security strategies and approaches to governance	-	0	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	--
Split in thematic thrust	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	0	0	---
Sum of overall cultural effect on gaps	-	0	----	++	+	---	++	--	+	----

**Table 3.4: Cultural factor summarized evidence of impact (four big factors)**

*Knowledge and interpretation (model II)* – styles to make sense of facts as they are rooted in national political culture and reinforced by political structure are the strongest factors for better and for worse. They in sum have most country-related evidence and almost equally often account for the existence of gaps and the potential to overcome gaps. Factors related to knowledge and interpretation are most often associated with negative effects on all four types of gaps under consideration here. In particular, they hamper the overcoming of international splits in thematic thrust. They though have not a comparable main effect when it comes to overcoming gaps, playing the strongest positive role only in overcoming lacks of comparable sets of security strategies and approaches to security governance.

*Cultural practices (model IV)*, e.g. experienced-based (vs. model-type) strategies of coordination and consensus-making about domestic security (research) policy alternatives, more often account for overcoming gaps than for the existence of gaps. They in fact have the least negative effect and at the same time the second strongest positive effect (behind *knowledge and interpretation*) on gaps. In particular, they increase the potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level. This reinforces our assumption that common or compatible practices/repertoires of action between states can help streamline national approaches to security (research) governance or streamline national and European approaches even in the absence of common normative values and a shared symbolic understanding of security on a common (European) scale. The EU should therefore support cross-national compatibility of security capabilities as well as support standardization and certification procedures through EU and national bodies.

*Normative values (model I)* (security as a societal, a technical, a European etc. value) and *common symbols (model III)* (e.g. are security threats symbolized by ICT, by crime or by natural disaster etc.?) in most of the cases account for the existence of gaps. In particular, they hamper the development of a comparable set of strategies and approaches to security governance and integration of research. Our assumption therefore is that a lack of common normative values between states as well as a lack of a common symbolic understanding/framing of shared normative values (e.g. counter-terrorism) reinforces gaps even if a common basis of knowledge exists between states.


In an overall picture across all countries studies, *cultural factors typically increase the potential for a comprehensive approach to security-enhancing interventions at the national level.*

However, cultural factors typically limit the potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level, for overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to the governance of security interventions (coordination vs. standardization) as well as for overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology).

### 3.5 Sum-up and policy recommendations

EU action to enhance, support and coordinate security-enhancing interventions of Member States should take into account that the development of a common “culture of security” as for example advocated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) – thus activating cultural factors in the process of policy implementation – will not necessarily facilitate harmonization of national security (research) policies. In the majority of the countries considered here, security continues to be a national cultural value. Common symbols and values representing security on a European level may (still) lead to divergent national responses. This is well exemplified by the operationalization of the European guiding principle of citizen security in different national strategies as illustrated Figure 3.1, based on the results of the textual analysis of national security strategies/research programmes.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>37</sup> This analysis is described in Siedschlag, “European Countries National Security Research Policy Compared in the Light of FP 7” (fn 2).



**Figure 3.1: Thematic belts and axis of areas of security interventions as defined in national security research programmes of EU Member States<sup>38</sup>**

Common symbols and values representing security on a European level therefore need to be preceded by a process of convergence of national practices and instruments for security-enhancing governance measures and appropriate measures in the context of security research programmes.

<sup>38</sup> Source: Adapted from a PowerPoint presentation prepared by Bruno Mazzetti and Alexander Siedschlag in ESRIWG 10.

## 4 National citizen security cultures compared: Secondary analysis and interpretation of empirical findings

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### 4.1 The example of criminology

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Based on the example of criminology as adopted by CPSI for survey-related analyses, this chapter summarizes the findings from the citizen level of culture analysis. Classical as well as subsequent studies have found crime-related perceptions of the public to be highly susceptible to social stereotyping as well as individual exposure to mass media coverage, whereas related perceptions of vulnerability typically do not increase citizens' involvement in preventive measures.<sup>39</sup> According to public opinion research in the Anglo-Saxon area, citizens typically attribute the locus of responsibility for crime prevention to the society as a whole rather than the legal system or the state as such.<sup>40</sup> This may be the reason why citizens, typically judging on an imperfect knowledge base – given e.g. the disproportionately high media coverage of violent crimes – tend to produce gaps between knowledge and opinion when there is a strong public ideology in place.<sup>41</sup>

Cultural practices already play a role when it comes to the “social construction of crime records”, which depend on culture in action on administrative and legal provisions for defining crime.<sup>42</sup> This also concerns reporting styles, which typically rely on victimisation reports, neglecting the social dimension of crime recording, including negotiations about the quality and seriousness of deviant behaviour suffered by victims. Crime rates in this perspective say less about actual (in-)security than they say about social facts, e.g. consensually defined types of crimes, and the professional culture of the police as embedded in a countries' political/public culture –<sup>43</sup> the CPSI analysis of which has been reported in Chapter 3.

Public opinion research on crime and crime risks therefore has been said to better represent virulent ideological presumptions and frames, or – neutrally speaking – characteristics of political culture than in fact citizens' perceptions themselves. Our results however indicate that public and citizen security culture should be studied in their own right, as country groupings identified by national public security culture analysis (Chapter 3) are not consistently reproduced by country groupings yielded by the citizen security culture analysis as reported in the present chapter.

The analysis is based on the two analytical datasheets we produced concerning public security culture measured by survey desk research, founded on the method of qualitative empirical analysis as addressed in the description of the methodology in Chapter 2.

- “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions. A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis” (Appendix B)

This datasheet contains the results of a secondary analysis of relevant Standard EUROBAROMETER opinion poll data from the CPSI case study countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), compared to the EU average (EU-15/EU-25/EU-27 as applicable). Crime as a national and a European concern of EU citizens is followed over the past five years (2003-2007), on the basis of poll data provided by the respective autumn EUROBAROMETER surveys.

“Crime” is understood here as domestic crime with a focus on neighbourhood safety, and EUROBAROMETER items were picked accordingly. Timeline comparison is limited by the fact that

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<sup>39</sup> Julian V. Roberts and Loretta J. Stalans, *Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997, 124-125.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 124

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 291.

<sup>42</sup> Frances Heidensson, *Crime and Society*. Houndmills, Basingstoke et al.: Macmillan, 1989: 6-7.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 6.

not all relevant items are reflected in each EUROBAROMETER. Specific information on this analytical constraint is provided with each of the following tables.

On the basis of correlations, hypotheses about sources of citizens' fear of crime in the seven focus countries are developed and cross-checked for plausibility.

The datasheet first investigates crime as a concern of citizens on the national level and compares these data with citizens' preferences for a national vs. European locus of decision-making and action in crime fighting. This is done to check initial evidence of the following hypothesis on predictors for success of interventions:

*“Success of interventions to increase felt security/reduce citizens' fear of crime is bigger when the interventions happen on the national (as opposed to the European) level.”*

EU citizens' fear of crime could also come from the European level itself, e.g. reflecting the border control problem. It is assessed whether European Union means more crime to citizens and how this perception has evolved over time. To gain initial evidence of the hypothesis

*“The EU is locus of citizens' fear of crime in their own country”,*

perception of crime as a problem on the national level is compared with the perception that the European Union means more crime (this item is unfortunately since 2006 no longer included in EUROBAROMETER). Crime as a concern of citizens on the EU level is then checked for association with citizens' favour of national decision-making, which in the case of a positive association would support the EU locus of fear of crime hypothesis.

- “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level” (Appendix C)

This data sheet presents a sum-up of empirical criminological statistical findings (based on indicators testable by means of opinion polls and interviews) associated with felt vs. actual security and factors causing feeling of insecurity, as exemplified by fear of crime. Building on these data, it presents inductive typologies of national citizen security cultures as summarized in Table 4.1. Two main descriptors are used:

- *Personal fear of crime* (crime perceived as an individual or an individualized problem) – *social fear of crime* (crime perceived as a problem “out there” in the society, irrespective of personal impact)
- *Realistic – underfear – overfear of crime*, based on the relation between personal fear of crime and victimization, social fear of crime and victimization as well as crime rate and perception of crime as a prior problem.

In its last part, the data sheet derives testable hypotheses for further empirical work in the CPSI public opinion work package (WP 2.3) and for the validation study in WP 4. These hypotheses cover “causes of fear of crime” (also in relation to actual security) and “social effectiveness criteria for security technologies” (with CCTV as example).

	AT	BG	DE	FR	IT	NL	SE	UK
Tentative typology of citizen security culture	Realistic fear of crime Social fear culture	Overfear Personal fear culture	Underfear Balanced personal/social fear culture	Overfear Balanced personal/social fear culture	(scattered; in sum close to realistic fear of crime) Personal fear culture	Between underfear and realistic fear of crime Social fear of crime culture	Unbalanced Social fear of crime culture	Underfear Balanced personal/social fear culture
Victimization	-	0	0	-	0	+	0	+
Over/under-average offences per 100.000 population	0	-	0	-	-	+	+	+
Personal fear of crime level	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	0
Personal fear : victimization	0	n/a	-	+	+	-	-	-
Social fear of crime level	0	0	-	0	-	+	+	0
Social fear : victimization	+	n/a	-	+	-	0	+	-
Relationship between felt societal security and felt personal security level	social > personal	n/a	social = personal	social = personal	social < personal	social > personal	social > personal	social = personal
Public debates centred on ... security	perceived	actual	perceived	actual	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
Policy interventions based on ... security	actual	perceived	perceived	perceived	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
CCTV acceptance	-	n/a	0	-	+	n/a	n/a	+
Technology as threat/ source of insecurity or as a solution (line 10)	Threat		Solution	Threat	Solution	Threat	Solution	Solution

Table 4.1: Qualitative findings: Citizen security cultures by indicators (from Appendix C)

## 4.2 Country-related findings

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### 4.2.1 Austria

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Austria has a low victimization and personal fear of crime level but the social fear of crime level is relatively high compared to the actual level of victimization. Reflecting this social “overfear” of crime, public debates tend to centre on perceived rather than actual security. Nevertheless, citizen security culture<sup>44</sup> can in sum be described as marked by realistic fear of crime. This may also be due to policy interventions being typically based on actual security rather than moral panic. In fact, crime as a concern for Austrian citizens has dropped by 46 per cent from 2003 to 2007, which is greatly above the EU average drop of 14 per cent.<sup>45</sup> In sum, this reproduces the finding of Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003)<sup>46</sup> that Austrian citizens have a strong perception of relative safety. Citizens have under-average concern about crime on a national level, along with a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. At the same time, interestingly, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.<sup>47</sup> Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is low, and technology is by the public more seen as a threat (or part of the problem) than a part of the solution.

### 4.2.2 Bulgaria

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According to police recording, Bulgaria has an under-average to average victimization level, with average social fear but high personal fear of crime. Still, public debates centre on actual security as represented by reported offences, whereas policy interventions seem to be rather based on perceived security and perceived relevance of issues in the political arena. The resulting lack of responsiveness to citizen (actual) fear of crime may be part of the explanation for the personal overfear present in Bulgaria. It may also explain the only slight fall (by 8%) that crime has seen from 2003-2007 as a perceived area of concern by citizens.<sup>48</sup> Citizens however have EU-average concern about crime and a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting.

### 4.2.3 France

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Victimization being relatively low but personal and social fear of crime being average, France has a citizen security culture of overfear. Whereas public debates typically centre on actual security, public interventions tend to focus on (in)security as perceived in the political arena. This is comparable to the situation in Bulgaria, which also has an overfear culture, so that public policy centred on perceived security, tending to be irresponsive to citizens’ needs based on actual security, can again be assumed to be part of the explanation for citizens’ overfear of crime.

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<sup>44</sup> The typology of citizen security culture presented here is developed in **Appendix C: Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security**. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level. The typology is based on three indicators: (1) Personal fear in relation to actual victimization level, (2) social fear in relation to actual victimization level and (3) perception of crime as a prior problem in relation to actual crime rate. Personal fear, social fear, victimization, crime rate and perception of crime as a prior problem are measured in figures from relevant survey data as documented in the annexed data/analytical sheet “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level”.

<sup>45</sup> Appendix A: Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions. A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis, table 1.

<sup>46</sup> “Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime,” Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) <[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_181\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_181_en.pdf)>

<sup>47</sup> Appendix A: Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions, table 5.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., table 1.

Overfear may also account for French citizens being split in their preference for EU-based as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. The EU is a locus of fear of crime for some citizens in France.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, crime as a citizen concern has constantly been decreasing, considerably more (43%) than EU average (14%) in the 2003-2007 period.<sup>50</sup> It is now clearly below EU average. Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is low, and technology is by the public more seen as a threat (or part of the problem) than a part of the solution.

#### 4.2.4 Germany

With an average level of victimization but equally low levels of personal and social fear of crime, Germany has an underfear citizen security culture. Public debates and policy interventions tend to centre more on perceived than on actual security. Nevertheless, crime as a citizen concern has dropped 17 per cent from 2003 to 2007, which is about EU average. Citizens have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting although there is a tendency to perceive the EU as a cause of crime.<sup>51</sup> At the same time, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.<sup>52</sup> Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by Closed Circuit Television, or CCTV, surveillance) is average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problems, and not as a security problem in itself.

#### 4.2.5 Italy

With personal overfear and social underfear in the face of average victimization, Italy in sum comes close to a citizen culture of realistic fear of crime. It is however, together with Bulgaria, one of the only two countries of all countries studied here in which personal fear of crime clearly outnumbers social fear of crime. In this respect, the Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding that Italy is a high-fear of crime country could be reproduced. In fact, Italy is the only of the countries under analysis here that has witnessed an increase (by 18%) in crime as a citizen concern over the 2003-2007 period, whereas EU average is a decrease by 14 per cent. Citizens have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. Accordingly, they perceive EU interventions to be more suitable to enhance their security against crime than national interventions. In fact, Italy is the only of the countries under review for which statistical analysis of EUROBAROMETER data clearly suggests a citizen preference for European solutions to national crime problems.<sup>53</sup> This may also be due to the fact that citizens' perception of the EU meaning more crime is farthest below EU average of all countries analyzed.<sup>54</sup> Data for all other countries suggest that citizens, even when in favour of EU decision-making and action in crime fighting, in general still prefer national solutions for specifically national security problems. Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is above average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

#### 4.2.6 Netherlands

Over-average victimization along with personal underfear and social overfear make the Netherlands in sum a country that has a balanced citizen fear of crime culture, but the social fear character of the security culture remains important, with technology rather perceived as associated with security problems than with solutions to security problems. For citizens personally, crime as

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., tables 6 and 7.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., table 1.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., tables 6 and 7.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., table 5.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., tables 3 and 4.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., table 5.

an issue of concern has considerably dropped (by 36%) in the 2003-2007 period, which is considerably more than the EU average (decrease by 14%). This is in keeping with the EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding that the Dutch have a strong perception of relative safety. Citizens also have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. At the same time however, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.<sup>55</sup> Technology is more perceived as part of the problem (posing security threats or being vulnerable against security threats) than part of the solution.

#### 4.2.7 Sweden

Having average victimization but clear over-average crime reporting as compared to the other countries analysed here, the Swedish citizen security culture seems to be unbalanced: Clear below-average personal fear of crime goes together with clear over-average social fear of crime. The result can be seen in a decrease of crime as a citizen concern by moderate 9 per cent in the 2003-2007 period, the EU average being 14 per cent. At the same time, citizens much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.<sup>56</sup> This not entirely reproduces the finding of Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) that Swedish citizens have a strong perception of relative safety. Citizens' preference for EU or national decision-making and action in crime fighting is fickle but the balance has recently been by 10 percentage points in favour of the EU. Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is above average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

#### 4.2.8 United Kingdom

The UK – based on the data for England and Wales – has a balanced personal/social fear culture that can be described as an underfear citizen security culture: victimization being high, personal and social fear levels are average. Therefore, the Special Eurobarometer 181 (2003) finding that the UK is a high fear of crime country could not be reproduced. The decrease of crime as a citizen concern is some moderate 8 per cent in the 2003-2007 period, the EU average being 14 per cent. This fact may account for the citizens' clear preference for national decision-making and action in crime fighting. The EU can be assumed a locus of citizen fear of crime.<sup>57</sup> However, citizens' perception of the EU meaning more crime is below EU average.<sup>58</sup> Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is high, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

### 4.3 Sum-up and policy recommendations

The EU itself generally does not seem to be a source of citizens' fear of crime in their own country; France, Germany and the UK appear to be exceptions. At the same time, citizens still perceive national interventions to be most suitable to enhance their security against crime. Though public support for EU decision-making and action against crime has increased recently, the EU continues generally not to be perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime. The exception is Italy's citizen security culture, where people appear to prefer EU solutions also to national security problems.

Following this result, investigation in the effect of culture on the perception of (in)security and effectiveness of interventions should mainly take place on the national level and has limits to generalization. It should always take into account the specific political culture and tradition of a country. Whereas it is the purpose of this report to provide general conclusions about cultural issues, CPSI WP 4.4 will also elaborate country case studies, focusing on national cultural

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., table 5.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., table 5.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., table 6.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., table 5.

contexts and how they specifically guide citizens' perception of (in)security and an attitudes towards interventions. These country case studies integrate results from government and citizen levels of analysis and form part of the CPSI final deliverable. Indicative results from this ongoing work are provided in Chapter 5 of this report.

It was an important purpose of the culture analysis on the citizen level, based on a comparative statistical analysis, to develop a couple of hypotheses for testing in further research on cultural factors. These hypotheses were developed inductively, by interpretation of correlations of the survey data secondary analysis as presented in this chapter. In addition, a qualitative consistency check of these hypotheses was undertaken, resulting in the following assumptions about cultural factors in the perception of (in)security and interventions (for a full account, see Appendix B and Appendix C):

High social fear of crime countries (crime perceived as a problem “out there”, on the national level as opposed to an immediate personal or neighbourhood issue, such as prominent in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden) have under-average personal fear of crime but an over-average number of offences reported to police, indicating low actual security. Personal fear of crime in this type of countries is also lower than the victimization level would suggest. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*Social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime: Strong knowledge and interpretative contexts present on the national level are a cultural factor that decreases citizens' individual perception of insecurity.*

High personal fear of crime countries – where crime is perceived as an individual(ized) issue, such as prominent in Bulgaria and Italy – can still have average victimization levels. They have however an under-average number of offences reported to police (high actual security) and average or under-average social fear of crime. Personal fear of crime is thus more detached from actual security than social fear of crime. This reinforces the assumption of the cultural selection of risk theory that collective styles to make sense of facts as they are rooted in national political culture are a strong, if not the strongest factor for mainstreaming perceptions of (in)security, at the same time keeping them close to the factual level of (in)security. Also in high personal fear of crime countries, more social fear of crime is associated with less personal fear of crime. This is concordant with the above hypothesis that social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime, and it is also in line with the following hypothesis that was developed in our qualitative empirical analysis (see Chapter 2):

*Actual insecurity particularly increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem “out there”) but decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern).*

The evidence leading to this hypothesis also shows the need to supplant cultural analysis based on risk research, as it is the approach taken in WP 4.4 (see Chapter 1) by the psychological level of analysis in risk research. Especially, felt as opposed to actual security has also been found to depend on personal control/efficacy beliefs: People usually accept considerably higher risk if they feel themselves in a position to decide about it; they are less prone to accept unconditional collective risk, e.g. as communicated by public authorities. At the same time, psychological analyses have found the effect of “overconfidence” (optimistic self-overestimation).<sup>59</sup> This effect describes a systematic cognitive error in assessing risks (namely assessing them to low) that are amenable to people's own influence, such as car driving, mountaineering but also walking alone in the dark, as a typical (street) crime-related public opinion poll indicator of felt security.

<sup>59</sup> E.g. Stuart Oskamp, “Overconfidence in case-study judgements.” *The Journal of Consulting Psychology* 2 (1965): 261-265, reprinted in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*. Cambridge University Press, 1982, 287-293.

A second psychological aspect of concern is the “homeostasis” effect.<sup>60</sup> This effect describes the fact of experience that an increase in technological solutions for risk reduction in the long run results in the same risk levels because people adopt riskier behaviour by making use of new technical means. This effect has been known from car drivers and could be of relevance for the social effectiveness of technical solutions to security problems, such as CCTV.

Especially CCTV has been discussed for its alleged symbolic, crime displacing or crime preventing value. So CCTV may be used to address actual and/or perceived security. How it is used of course depends not only on citizen acceptance but on the public user culture, also that of the state. Matching of political initiatives with crime rate/main offences and public debates can give a hint, to be followed by further analysis, if public interventions are more directed at actual or perceived security issues. In Austria and the UK for example, interventions are more directed at actual security issues. In Bulgaria, France and Germany for example, interventions are more directed at perceived security issues. These countries differ in their citizen security culture (see *Table 5*), so it can be concluded that the type of citizen security culture is however not associated with the direction of interventions.

Empirical results further suggest that we should also look at culture as a dependent variable: That means to analyze how citizens’ perception of (in)security changes the very cognitive context in which security risks are socially interpreted and attributed meaning. In this respect, especially the following hypotheses developed in WP 4.4 secondary analysis of survey data are relevant:

*Lower rate of reported offences (a) increase general fear of crime and (b) reduce trust in police (probably because it lowers citizens’ belief in effective state authorities’ intervention).*

This hypothesis fits into the argumentative context developed by Juha Tapio Kääriäinen in his comparative study on trust in police in various European countries.<sup>61</sup> Among other things, he found high investment rates in the public safety sector – which may be perceived by the citizens as evidence for existing gaps and ineffectiveness – to decrease the trust in these institutions.<sup>62</sup>

*Trust-building interventions such as community policing, resulting in a high police penetration (visibility of the police), reduce citizens’ fear of street crime but may increase fear of home-related crime.*

This is probably because police penetration increases number of reported offences, and a high number of reported offences tends to be interpreted as effectiveness of state authorities’ security interventions. Generally, belief in effective state authorities’ intervention could be identified as a predictor for underaverage fear of crime, as compared to actual insecurity operationalized by number of offences.

*However, the bigger the trust in police, the more offences are reported, and this increases fear of crime.*

More reported offences again increase trust in police (which in the light of offence reporting may be perceived as a problem-solver). Through this causal path, interventions (such as community policing) that increase trust in police may indirectly increase fear of crime.

Finally, a general caveat is in place with respect to the analysis of cultural factors of the perception of (in)security based on public opinion in victimological survey data.

<sup>60</sup> Gerald J. Wilde, “The Theory of Risk Homeostasis: Implications for Safety and Health,” *Risk Analysis* 2, no. 4 (2006): 209-225.

<sup>61</sup> Juha Tapio Kääriäinen, “Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries,” *European Journal of Criminology* 4, no. 4 (2007), 409-435.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 409.

First, fear of crime is itself a “cultural theme”, as Garland has noted in his seminal work on *The Culture of Control*, and speaks for little confidence of the public in public authorities’ role in crime prevention.<sup>63</sup> This may also be true for debates about the effectiveness of technological solutions for security problems. Despite its clear acceptance on a European average, the population of Europe’s large cities seems not to have strong efficiency beliefs in CCTV, as the URBANEYE project<sup>64</sup> found more than half of the respondents to believe that CCTV does not prevent crime but shifts it to other location and does also not protect against assaults.<sup>65</sup>

Second, further research should increasingly cover the phenomenon of underfear in addition to the dominant focus on overperception of insecurity by citizens. Classical risk research reported by Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein in their essay “Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking”<sup>66</sup> supports the assumption that the acceptability of risks to people is proportional to the perceived benefits, which also supports the hypothesis that socially accepted benefits can lower citizens risk perception below the level of the respective actual risk.

This would mean that in a given surveillance culture, citizens’ scepticism towards video surveillance is lower, rather than that high public acceptance levels of CCTV lead to the development of a surveillance culture based on technological (rather than social and political) triggers. It also means that walking alone in the dark, a classical item in felt security polls, may be deemed less risky by urban dwellers, living in an attractive nightlife environment, than relevant statistics on street crime in that area would suggest. A further assumption of classical research is that public willingness to accept voluntary risk is approximately 1.000 times higher than its preparedness to tolerate involuntary risk. One should consequently assume that in opinion polls, items such as “Feeling unsafe when Walking alone in the dark” (which is a voluntary action) tend to produce an underestimation of citizens perception of insecurity, whereas items such as “Probability of house broken into within the next 12 months” tend to produce an overestimation of citizens perception of insecurity. This would also be an important step towards a typology of perception differences between different typified locations (cities, towns, regions, country).

The URBANEYE project attributes differences in CCTV acceptance to a certain extent to different cultural traits of the population but not further discusses this proposition.<sup>67</sup> Our analysis however has shown no consistent association between acceptance of technological solutions for security problems (such as CCTV) and relationship between level of societal and of personal fear of crime, level of victimization, relationship between felt and actual personal/social security and victimization.

Important to conclude, acceptance of technological solutions for security problems was not found to depend on the country’s citizen security culture (e.g. social under-/overfear as compared to crime rate, personal fear of crime and social fear of crime) but rather on the general public attitude towards technology: Our analysis found countries in which technology is interpreted as part of the security problem (e.g. critical infrastructure protection, information technology as object of offence and source of insecurity) to have lower public CCTV acceptance than countries where technology is interpreted as part of the solution (e.g. information technology as a foundation for coordinated, efficient prevention and response).

Even if our empirical qualitative analysis of citizen security culture has no directly yielded social effectiveness criteria for security technologies, our analysis of public security culture as reported in Chapter 3 suggests that there should be culture-dependent knowledge-based conditions under which the public will accept technology as a solution to security problems and that they are worth investigating in subsequent studies:

<sup>63</sup> Garland, *Culture of Control* (fn 4), 10.

<sup>64</sup> <http://www.urbaneye.net>.

<sup>65</sup> Leon Hempel and Eric Töpfer, *CCTV in Europe. Final Report*. Berlin: Centre for Technology and Society, Technical University Berlin, 2004 <[http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue\\_wp15.pdf](http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf)>, 8 and 45.

<sup>66</sup> Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, „Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking,“ in Paul Slovic, *The Perception of Risk*. London/Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2000, 32-50.

<sup>67</sup> See Hempel and Töpfer, *CCTV in Europe* (fn 65), 44.

Countries with a security culture of comprehensiveness, bringing prevention and response together in a transversal approach, such as Austria, France and Germany, should exhibit more rejection than acceptance of one-sided, technological, solutions, such as CCTV. In contrast, a security culture attaching high value to standardized procedures to prevention, as it is shared by the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, can be expected to show good rates of public support for technological security solutions that in public perception are, as CCTV is, associated with prevention. The same goes for countries that share a network-based public-policy conception of security, which the UK, Sweden and Italy have, along with general public support for CCTV. Combined results of public policy and citizen security culture support this hypothesis.

## 5 Steps ahead: Integrating findings from public and citizen security culture in CPSI country case studies

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European countries show different public and citizen security cultures, and both the political sector and the public vary across countries in their perception of the locus of responsibility for citizen security. In the course of the CPSI project, given these findings, it has been decided to lay more emphasis than originally planned on the particular study of national security cultures, integrating findings from public and citizen security culture in eight CPSI country case studies, covering the countries represented in the End-user Advisory Group: Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

The CPSI country case studies will be delivered separately as part of the Final Report. Overarching public-policy and citizen-level of culture analysis, they will provide country-specific assessments of pre-existing worldviews, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions in the European Union and its Member States, as well as the efficiency perception of technology-based security solutions. This is a preview of the line of reasoning on which this is going to be done and of indicative results:

The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have a security governance culture that emphasises international standardization over intra-national coordination and lining up with best practices of other countries. This international approach is reflected in relatively low levels of personal fear and a tendency to a social fear of crime culture, with citizens' attributing their (in)security to causes beyond their immediate life context. In such a public security culture, even over-average citizen security incidents such as offences and over-average victimization rates result in comparatively low personal fear but considerable and disproportionately high social fear. Consistent with the interpretation, the three countries show a high national-level concern of citizens about crime. A social fear of crime/perception of (in)security culture however does not necessarily go along with citizens' acceptance of a supranational European approach to security.

In UK, the security policy culture centres on homeland security symbolism, integrating interventions against conventional and terrorist threat. The method of integration is based on technology, and political communication highlights the need to protect critical infrastructure on all levels – from home to high-tech. Citizens' fear of crime appears to be Europeanized, and citizens perceive technology mainly as a solution to security problems and do not weight it against other values such as privacy. This can be attributed to the political selection of risks in terms of comprehensiveness, as shown by the analysis of the security policy culture of the UK. The public in the UK will the more accept a security problem to be solved the more the solution is embedded into a comprehensive solution, addressing political, technological and normative context. At the same time, the proposed solution should be located on the level of perception of the source of the security problem. For example, statistical analysis of survey data has shown that the public expects EU-caused crime issues to be solved at the EU level, not at the national level. Conversely, it expects domestic responsibility and solutions for home-grown crime issues.

In Austrian political culture, security is a national symbol, the preservation of which requires a comprehensive approach on the national level. This is mirrored by a specific citizen security culture, as exemplified by criminological survey data: realistic fear of crime with a predominance of social fear. In addition, corresponding to the action repertoires of consocialism and consensus democracy as noted in the governmental-level analysis, fear of crime is externalized, as the statistical analysis of survey data revealed (e.g., high perception of crime as product of the EU is associated with low perception of crime as a national problem). The hypothesis therefore is that Austrian citizens will perceive a security problem to be solved when it can be seen as an Austrian solution to a European issue. It is consistent with this assumption that Austrian citizens typically see technology, which not much allows for culture-sensitive solutions to security problems, as risk-laden or even as a threat to their security. Consequently, Austrian security research concentrates on domestic technological innovation.

## 6 Communication and the perception of security

Cultural communication basically falls into an own field of study, typically embedded into media studies.<sup>68</sup> However, the idea of CPSI culture analysis is not to investigate how culture changes communication, as cultural communication schools of thought typically do, but to elaborate important aspects of cultural sensitivity that communication-related interventions into citizens' perceptions of security should have. As noted in the introduction, related research within CPSI is conducted in WP 2.3 as it was found to be mainly an issue of the research area public opinion. Nevertheless, this report identifies general rules for communicating risk in order to close, rather than expand, gaps between actual and felt security on the side of the citizens.

This necessity to line-up with results from public opinion research in WP 2.3 is reinforced by empirical data from the URBANEYE project which support the assumption that in addition to cultural differences, public awareness mainstreaming, mainly through media reporting, accounts for acceptance levels of CCTV and for specific acceptance levels of particular CCTV application areas. Acceptance therefore must be expected to change along public awareness cycles, irrespective of deeper-rooted cultural traits in favour or disapproval of security technologies: "The Viennese, for example, though often rather sceptical, were being most supportive for CCTV along motorways. This might be explained by the fact that CCTV in Austria was mainly discussed in the context of Alps tunnel safety. People in Oslo were most supportive for CCTV in taxi passenger seats; maybe because CCTV was recently discussed after assaults against taxi drivers."<sup>69</sup>

Actual WP 4.4 findings also underline the need to expand on culture analysis results by public opinion research in order to assess alternative hypotheses developed in WP 4.4 by external data and findings. For instance, a good matching between crime rate/main offences and public debates can either be evidence of a reflective/responsive public debate and realistic fear of crime or of poor preventive effect of risk communication.<sup>70</sup> A good matching exists in France. Sufficient matching exists in Bulgaria and the UK. A poor matching between crime rate/main offences and public debates can either be evidence of a non-responsive public debate and unrealistic or (e.g. media-)constructed fear of crime or of good preventive effect of risk communication. A poor matching exists in Austria and Germany.

The definitions and concepts of culture as used in the four big factors model (Chapter 3) appear to be of special importance here, in particular, Geertz classic definition of "culture" as "a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."<sup>71</sup> This definition, along with the tenets of cultural theory,<sup>72</sup> leads us to expect that any discourse within a cultural community will primarily be *self-referential* rather than deliberative, i.e., not open to information and cognition, but necessarily confined to social sub-contexts. Thus, general rules as to how culture guides the subjective experience of communicated risk or (in)security need let us expect that cultural factors contribute to gaps as well as to the reproduction of differences among and between communities.

While it is indisputable that public communication and the formation of public opinion about risk should be seen as results of socially negotiated and constructed sense-making that takes place in

<sup>68</sup> Cf. James W. Carey, *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

<sup>69</sup> See Hempel and Töpfer, *CCTV in Europe* (fn 65), 44.

<sup>70</sup> See Appendix C: Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level, Empirical country profile matrix, line 12 and line 18.

<sup>71</sup> Geertz: *The Interpretation of Cultures* (fn 33).<sup>89</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Roger M. Keesing: "Theories of Culture," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 3 (1974): 73-97; Michael Thompson, Richard J. Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky: *Cultural Theory* Boulder et al.: Westview, 1990; Wuthnow et al., *Cultural Analysis* (fn 34)

cultural contexts, as the school of risk communication maintains,<sup>73</sup> culture thus involves the self-referentiality of arguments and interpretation, risking cognitive and argumentative closure and gaps. This risk of closure and gaps also brings about the risk of fragmentation of the public into hermetic partial publics through communication-based interventions. Strictly speaking, this should even render discourse between members of different cultural communities as improbable as an exchange of views on different concepts of security and related values. In sum, from a cultural communication perspective, it has been argued that public risk and crisis communication will sustain, if not reinforce existing gaps between actual and perceived security if it lacks cultural contextualization.<sup>74</sup> However, findings from the theory of culture as applied in the research for this report rather let us assume that cultural contextualization can not be reached by communication-related interventions. As a UNHABITAT study has concluded, “the perception of insecurity in cities depends largely upon the substantial amount and constant flow of information that urban residents receive from many sources.”<sup>75</sup> Effectiveness criteria for risk communication thus have to take into account complementing intrapersonal processes, the social context of personalization as well as tendency of individuals to seek social support for their assessment of risk messages and their truth.

Risk research even assumes that communication will virtually always produce gaps between actual and felt security and thus is no strategy on which security-enhancing interventions should be based. Risk research argues that psychological, social, cultural and political factors in their interaction lead to an “amplification of risk” in public perception/opinion (as compared to the expert rating of a given risk) and that this amplification is triggered by the “signal value” that especially media information about risk contains.<sup>76</sup> A signal value is a communicated frame of reference by which citizens structure their perception of a reported risk situation in a way that it provides new information about the likelihood of future risks of the same kind.

A train of thought that has already been mentioned and is immediately thematically relevant to CPSI and centres on this type of relationship is “cultural criminology”,<sup>77</sup> as it addresses, based on postmodern reasoning, the impact of cultural change on struggling meaning, authority and power. Methodologically, cultural criminology makes the case for a criminology of *verstehen* (understanding) as opposed to a positivist criminology of crime statistics.<sup>78</sup> It seeks to elaborate the qualitative contexts in which criminological figures are produced and assigned meaning. Cultural criminology in its focus on communication is concerned with media construction of crime and justice and its cultural representations, which it sees mainly exemplified by labelling. Cultural criminology sees a main task of social scientists in providing fact-based information to clarify debates about criminal subcultures, threats and violence. Especially, this should contribute to communicating empirical knowledge about certain types of (citizens’) fear as opposed to media constructions, thus clarifying the relationship between actual and media-mediated fear of crime.

The practical recommendation that results from this is that communication-centred interventions should be based on actual rather than perceived security and communicate information rather than values and warnings, thus providing citizens’ with resources on which they can base their own reasoning. This also corresponds to findings from disaster research which underscore the role of issue-specific experts in helping to develop demystifying strategies to communicate security issues without risking contributing to the gap between actual and perceived

<sup>73</sup> Falkheimer and Heide, “Multicultural Crisis Communication” (fn 11).

<sup>74</sup> B. Kaman Lee, “Crisis, Culture, Community,” in Pamela J. Kalbfleisch (ed.), *Communication Yearbook*, vol. 29. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2005, 275-309.

<sup>75</sup> United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *Enhancing Urban Safety and Security* (fn 12), 19.

<sup>76</sup> Roger E. Kasperson et al., “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework,” in Paul Slovic: *The Perception of Risk*. London/Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 232-245.

<sup>77</sup> Ferrell and Sanders, *Cultural Criminology* (fn 8); Jeff Ferrell et al., *Cultural Criminology Unleashed* (fn 8).

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

security.<sup>79</sup> This recommendation is also in line with empirical findings from WP 4.4 as reported in Chapter 4. For example, offences should be reported on a continuous factual basis, also in the media – replacing the common practice of media reporting stylized single-cases, which can lead to citizens developing the assessment that this are in fact exemplary cases, which in turn easily moves their feeling of (in)security away from facts.

Arguing from a cognition-based cultural point of view (as e.g. addressed in WP 4.4 by *model II “knowledge and interpretation”*, see Chapter 3), Slovic maintains in his essay on “Informing and Educating the Public about Risk” that mass media reporting often sets such signal values, highlighting the memorability of an event and equating it with the imaginability of future events of the same kind.<sup>80</sup> Thus, heavy media coverage of single events can be expected to push up public risk/threat perception for a whole class of comparable events, leading to citizens’ overestimation of insecurity. The amplification effect can be assumed to be strongest in cases where citizens have no direct experience of risk and insecurity and are dependent on information and external first interpretation that often mobilizes latent fears.<sup>81</sup>

As addressed in WP 4.4 by *model III “common symbols”*, see Chapter 3), Garland argues, the victim and its fears have become a “symbolic figure”, individual victims are taken as “Everyman” and the public opinion rests on the assumption of a steadily increase in crime rates met by no efficient public response, thus reducing public confidence and reinforcing the perception of certain types of victimization as symbol of the state of public safety/security affairs in general.<sup>82</sup> Popular perceptions of crime are reinforced by mass media, with TV representations of crime and justice influencing emotional responses of the public while it equates (selective) media reporting and dramatization of single stories with factual information about the state of crime and criminological security.<sup>83</sup> In fact, as far as common-law culture countries are concerned, it has been shown that media treatment of single cases can initiate changes in the judicial system of a nation.<sup>84</sup> As Garland concludes, citizens’ knowledge and opinion about crime is “based upon collective representations rather than actual information; upon a culturally given experience of crime, rather than the thing itself.”<sup>85</sup>

In addition, moving away from a fact-based communication strategy where it is in place, for example by lowering the rate of reported offences may increase fear of crime and lower citizens’ perception of the effectiveness of interventions. Although our empirical analysis in the field of citizen security cultures also has shown that in some cases, reporting about actual insecurity (including individualized stories about latest incidents) is an instrument to reduce personal fear of crime, it has been found to increase social fear of crime, thus being arguably directly responsible for gaps between actual and felt security.

To conclude, while risk research maintains communication-centred interventions in dense cultural contexts will almost ever move perceived security away from actual security, it holds hypothesis about when we have to expect underfear and when we have to expect overfear. This follows Dake’s cognitive concept of culture as a set of “orienting dispositions” guiding peoples’ perception and cognitive response to complex situations.<sup>86</sup> Cross-cultural risk research conducted on the basis of Dake’s concept yielded empirical evidence for political macro culture to be a predictor for citizens’ perception of risk:<sup>87</sup> An egalitarian political culture with a preference for equal

<sup>79</sup> Vincent T. Covello et al. “Risk Communication, the West Nile Virus Epidemic, and Bioterrorism: Responding to the Communication Challenges Posed by the Intentional or Unintentional Release of a Pathogen in an Urban Setting,” *Journal of Urban Health* 78 (2001): 382-391.

<sup>80</sup> Paul Slovic, „Informing and Educating the Public about Risk,” *Risk Analysis* 6, no. 4 (1986): 403-415.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Kasperson et al., “Social Amplification of Risk” (fn 76), 241.

<sup>82</sup> Garland, *The Culture of Control* (fn 4), 11.

<sup>83</sup> Roberts and Stalans, *Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice* (fn 39).

<sup>84</sup> E.g. David C. Anderson, *Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Case Changed American Justice*. New York: Times Books, 1995.

<sup>85</sup> Garland, *The Culture of Control* (fn 4), 158.

<sup>86</sup> Drake, “Orienting dispositions in the perception of risk” (fn 9).

<sup>87</sup> Such as Peters and Slovic, “The role of affect and worldviews as orienting dispositions in the perception and acceptance of nuclear power” (fn 10).

distribution of values and assets in the society seems to facilitate higher than actual perception of risk. Conversely, a hierarchical political culture with higher trust in (or locus-of-control attribution to) (public) authorities seems to lower citizens' risk perception.

For indicative purposes it can be assumed that a personal fear of crime culture (following the types of citizen security culture developed in Chapter 4) is typologically associated with a more egalitarian or individualistic culture of security perception and interventions, whereas a social fear of crime culture is typologically more associated with a hierarchical or collectivist culture of security perceptions and interventions. Combining this scheme with assumptions from intercultural communication studies leads to the following hypotheses:

In individualistic cultures, public communication is low-context communication, that is, the larger part of information – often including 'suggestions' for reaction – is explicitly coded in the message and does not need to be constructed by the recipients out of the message's context, including the social context of communication and the negotiation of meaning.<sup>88</sup> Gaps between actual and perceived security should then be mainly attributable to disproportionate media reporting. As for the countries covered in CPSI WP 4.4, this should be the case in countries with a personal fear of crime culture, such as Bulgaria and Italy.

In the case of collectivist cultures and the high-context communication typical for them, recipients need to retrieve information from the physical context and activate information that they have internalized so to give full meaning to the message.<sup>89</sup> In collectivist cultures, we can expect citizens to belong to less different in-groups than in individualist cultures but these in-groups to have a stronger effect on opinion formation. Thus, media streamlining of fear of crime should be less present in collectivist cultures, as should be response to public communication of warnings, and at the same time, the citizens' sense making and development of fear of crime, or lack thereof, should be located in the definition of the situation as negotiated within the very limited number of in-groups citizens are assumed to belong to in collectivist cultures. Gaps between actual and perceived security should then be mainly attributable to disproportionate styles of social sense making. As for the countries covered in CPSI WP 4.4, this should be the case in countries with a social fear of crime culture, such as Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Table 6.1 summarizes main findings from WP 4.4 analysis as a basis to define culture-sensitive communication guidelines for security interventions.

- Risk communication needs to support citizens' search for security under a condition of absence of reliable information. Public communication therefore must provide relevant information that helps citizens to reactivate their earlier experience with risk and crisis.
- Effectiveness criteria for risk communication have to take into account complementing intrapersonal processes, the social context of personalization as well as tendency of individuals to seek social support for their assessment of risk messages and their truth. For risk communication and warnings to be effective (to result more often than not in citizen behaviour change), they need to spark ego-involvement on the basis of real and credible information
- Issue-specific experts are relevant in helping to develop demystifying strategies to communicate security issues without risking contributing to the gap between actual and perceived security.

<sup>88</sup> William B. Gudykunst and Stella Ting-Toomey, *Culture and Interpersonal Communication*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988, following semial terminology from Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

- In countries with a social fear of crime culture, communication-based interventions typically lower citizens perception of (in)security, and this type of gap between actual and perceived security is mainly due to styles of social meaning making as rooted in the social context.
- In countries with a personal fear of crime culture, communication-based interventions typically increase citizens perception of (in)security, and this type of gap between actual and perceived security is mainly attributable to disproportionate media reporting.

**Table 6.1: Cultural contexts of communication-based interventions**

## 7 Conclusion

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CPSI WP 4.4 culture analysis in sum reinforces the assumption from recent theoretical accounts of risk analysis that citizens' knowledge is the key factor for their perception of security and interventions. Knowledge also mediates between felt and actual security.

Moreover, knowledge is the first-rank effectiveness criteria for security-enhancing interventions. Interventions should in the first place be based on a comprehensive definition or articulation of actual risk based on exchange of knowledge. Policy interventions – as opposed – based on perceived security do not have an effect of responsiveness but increase citizens' fear of crime.

Generally, cultural factors turned out to be a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution. Contrariwise, security was found to continue to be mainly a national cultural value rather than representing a value common to European citizens. The EU itself is generally not perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime, although in most of the countries studied, citizens are in favour of EU decision-making in crime-fighting.

The main general findings of CPSI culture analysis can be summarized as follows, and they will be expanded on in the upcoming country case studies:

### Guidance of the experience of security in subjective terms by culture and mediation of the relationship between actual and perceived security

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The general assumption of cultural approaches to the perception of (in)security is that things such as fear of crime depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk. They are thus seen by cultural approaches more as an indicator of the collective memory of particular events as shaped by political response, media framing etc. than of citizens' actual security beliefs/perceptions.

This is in line with our findings that cultural impact on security is not a general predictor for fear. Nevertheless, cultural impact is associated with over-average perception of insecurity as a national problem. At the same time, security continues to be national cultural value. However, in citizens' perceptions of security, both the perception of security problems as national and as European is present, and we found related different impact of cultural factors:

Cultural factors have a positive impact on solutions to security problems when the security problems are perceived by the public as national (rather than European) problems.

Cultural factors have a negative impact on solutions to security problems when the security problems are perceived by the public as European (rather than national) problems.

Common symbols and values representing security on a European level may (still) lead to divergent national responses. Common symbols and values representing security on a European level need to be preceded by a process of convergence of national practices and instruments for security-enhancing governance measures and appropriate measures in the context of security research programmes.

The comparative analysis of national security research programmes has highlighted the predominant national conceptions of privacy and the role of the state as a security provider. The thematic thrust of national security research programmes has been found to be a good indicator of the cognitive conditions under which the public of a country will accept a security problem to be solved. By thematic thrust we mean the main conceptual orientation of the respective programme, e.g. whether it is technology or society-based, focused on prevention or incident management, rest on a comprehensive approach or on a functional-sectoral concept of security interventions, etc.

### What brings subjective security away from actual security? Which cultural factors are at work here?

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Citizens' subjective assessments of the security situation in their urban neighbourhood are a multiple construction and cannot be reduced to individual stories of victimization or to alleged key

drivers as usually covered in opinion poll items such as “feeling safe/unsafe when walking in dark”. Also, cultural impact as such does not preclude realistic (citizens’) fear of crime. However, personal and/or social over-fear of crime has been found associated with more than under-average cultural impact.

Cultural impact on security, as noted above, also is not a general predictor for fear; however, cultural impact is associated with over-average perception of insecurity as a national problem (as for example opposed to a European issue). As a consequence, common symbols and values representing security on a European level may still lead to divergent national responses. This is well exemplified by the operationalization of the European idea directive of citizen security in different national strategies.

Knowledge and interpretation – styles to make sense of facts as they are rooted in national political culture and reinforced by political structure are the strongest factors for better and for worse. They in sum have most country-related evidence and almost equally often account for the existence of gaps and the potential to overcome gaps.

### Guidelines and criteria security interventions and technologies need to meet in order to be effective and reinvigorated, as opposed to refuted or obstructed by the citizens

Citizen security culture is not associated with acceptance or rejection of technological solutions for security problems: Whether a society is characterised by overfear, underfear of realistic fear of crime or whether it has a social or a personal fear of crime culture has not been found to come along with a dominant citizens’ perception of technology as source of insecurity or of security, respectively. Rather, it was found to be associated with general public attitudes towards technology.

Invasive security-enhancing strategies tend to be better accepted by the public – with no great influence of conceptions of privacy and the role of the state as a security provide – in societies where technology as such is interpreted in everyday culture as innovation for good rather than something risky. On the level of public culture (as textually operationalized by national security strategies/research programmes), technological solutions (as opposed to society-involving and citizen-activating solutions) to security problems figure most prominently in a security culture that is marked by prevention and reliance on national mechanisms.

### Differential analysis of European security culture

High social fear of crime countries (crime perceived as a problem “out there”, on the national level as opposed to an immediate personal or neighbourhood issue, such as prominent in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden) have under-average personal fear of crime but an over-average number of offences reported to police, indicating low actual security. Personal fear of crime in this type of countries is also lower than the victimization level would suggest. This leads to the hypothesis that social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime. Strong knowledge and interpretative contexts present on the national level are a cultural factor that decreases citizens’ individual perception of insecurity.

High personal fear of crime countries – where crime is perceived as an individual(ized) issue, such as prominent in Bulgaria and Italy – can still have average victimization levels. They have however an under-average number of offences reported to police (high actual security) and average or under-average social fear of crime. Personal fear of crime is thus more detached from actual security than social fear of crime. This reinforces the assumption of the cultural selection of risk theory that collective styles to make sense of facts as they are rooted in national political culture are a strong, if not the strongest factor for mainstreaming perceptions of (in)security, at the same time keeping them close to the factual level of (in)security. Also in high personal fear of crime countries, more social fear of crime is associated with less personal fear of crime. This is concordant with the above hypothesis that social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime.

## Paths for change: Actual security – perceived security

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There are no clear lines of differences between perceived and actual security in cultural terms. In personal, social and balanced personal/social fear of crime cultures, realistic fear of crime, overfear and underfear can be observed. A citizen security culture marked by overfear (perception of crime > victimization) was even found to typically rest on public debates centred on actual security. A citizen security culture of overfear has however been found associated with policy interventions rather based on perceived security (e.g. as communicated by the media). In countries that have a balanced personal/social fear of crime culture, public debates about (in)security were more often found to be based on actual rather than on perceived threats, exemplified by fear of crime. No association is evident between a citizen security culture of underfear (perception of crime < victimization) and centeredness of public debates or policy interventions on actual or perceived security. The relationship between actual and perceived security has also not found to be differently mediated by a personal fear of crime than by a social fear of crime culture.

## Cultural predictors for the success of interventions

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Our analysis suggests that cultural factors (e.g. the continuation of the public interpretation of security as a national value) have the strongest evidence for a positive impact on developing a comprehensive approach to citizen security-enhancing interventions at the national level. Cultural factors typically limit the potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level.

Political initiatives and communication strategies focusing on actual (in)security support citizens' realistic fear of crime, whereas political initiatives rather addressing citizens' perceived (in)security may result in citizens developing either underfear or overfear.

Citizens' perception of technology as a security provider or a security threat is not associated with type of fear of crime (realistic, underfear, overfear) or their favour or rejection of European-level decision-making about security interventions (such as fighting crime). However, across the countries studies here, there is a rather consistent association between acceptance of technological solutions for security problems (such as CCTV) and cultural attitudes towards technology: Invasive security-enhancing strategies tend to be better accepted by the public in societies where technology as such is interpreted in everyday culture as innovation for good rather than something risky.

Consequently, countries in which technology is interpreted as part of the security problem (e.g. intrusion, privacy, data safety) have lower public acceptance for CCTV than countries where technology is interpreted as part of the solution. There is yet no consistent association between acceptance of technological solutions for security problems (e.g. CCTV), level of personal/social fear of crime and level of victimization.

Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems. Successful interventions should have a nation locus. The only country studied in which citizens clearly desire European solutions for security problems is Italy. Enhancement of nationally driven initiatives, including support for multilateral strategies already in place, is a more effective EU action in seeking a common approach to citizen security than harmonization is.

Cultural factors relating to knowledge and interpretation, especially styles to make sense of facts, have found to be the strongest cultural factors and almost as equally often account for gaps between security problems and security solutions as well as between actual and felt security as they do for overcoming those gaps. This makes it evident that security needs policy, explaining that and how need to protect relates to national and European interests. It is the best way to give legitimacy to interventions. In contrast, the association of the value of security with one-sided symbolic instances of its exposure (such as crime, terrorism, natural disaster, etc.) hampers the development of internationally comparable sets of strategies and approaches to the governance of citizen security. It can also contribute to a social overfear culture in the respective symbolic area.

In addition, proprietary cultural practices (factors relation to "action repertoires") in confronting threats as well gaps between their seriousness and citizens' perception thereof should be

strengthened and not harmonized. They help streamline different approaches to security governance even in the absence of common normative values and a shared understanding of security.

### Communicating risk

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Risk communication needs to support citizens' search for security under a condition of absence of reliable information. Public communication therefore must provide relevant information that helps citizens to reactivate their earlier experience with risk and crisis. Generally, reporting about actual insecurity (such as individualized stories about latest incidents) is an instrument to reduce personal fear of crime; however, it at the same time increases social fear of crime. Lowering the rate of reported offences may increase fear of crime and lower citizens' perception of the effectiveness of interventions.

In countries with a social fear of crime culture, communication-based interventions typically lower citizens' perception of (in)security, and this type of gap between actual and perceived security is mainly due to styles of social meaning making as rooted in the social context.

In countries with a personal fear of crime culture, communication-based interventions typically increase citizens' perception of (in)security, and this type of gap between actual and perceived security is mainly attributable to disproportionate media reporting.

Communication-based security-enhancing interventions should focus on awareness-building for risks rather than over-communication of single events; they communication-centred interventions should be based on actual rather than perceived security and communicate information rather than values and warnings, thus providing citizens' with resources on which they can base their own reasoning.

### Hypotheses for further research

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Further research building on CPSI culture analysis should further explore and test in the following hypothesis in particular:

- Social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime: Strong knowledge and interpretative contexts present on the national level are a cultural factor that decreases citizens' individual perception of insecurity.
- Actual insecurity particularly increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem "out there") but decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern).
- Lower rate of reported offences (a) increase general fear of crime and (b) reduce trust in police (probably because it lowers citizens' belief in effective state authorities' intervention).
- Trust-building interventions such as community policing, resulting in a high police penetration (visibility of the police), reduce citizens' fear of street crime but may increase fear of home-related crime.

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## Appendix A: Analytical matrix sheet (nation coding) for the four big cultural factors model

### Matrix 1: Assignment of evidence for each of the four big cultural factors (models I-IV) per country to the four identified gaps/challenges

AT Austria, DE Germany, ES Spain, FR France, IT Italy, NO Norway, NL Netherlands, SE Sweden, UK United Kingdom  
 A country may be have “+” and “-” -entries in the same field, reflecting an ambiguous effect of the respective cultural factor

Status/gap	Culture as a factor in the response to threat	Culture as a factor in the perception/definition of threat		Culture as a factor in the response to threat
	<b>Cultural factors influencing the national approach to security (research) governance</b>	<b>Cultural factors influencing the thematic thrust of national security research programmes</b>	<b>Cultural factors influencing the national approach to security (research) governance</b>	<b>Cultural factors influencing the thematic thrust of national security research programmes</b>
	<b>Model I Normative values</b>	<b>Model II Knowledge/interpretation</b>	<b>Model III Common symbols</b>	<b>Model IV Action repertories</b>
<b>Potential for a comprehensive approach at the national level</b>	<p><b>AT</b> + Tradition of and legal provisions for “comprehensive national defence”</p> <p><b>FR</b> + Internal security as a general concept in the context of sûreté which is meant to be a guarantee for exercising liberties and rights</p> <p><b>DE</b> - Technical understanding of security and culture of</p>	<p><b>AT</b> + Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy increases potential for pluralistic analysis</p> <p><b>FR</b> + Joint issuing of the current edition of the national security research programme by the National Research Agency, the General Delegation for Armament and the General Direction of the National Police</p>	<p><b>AT</b> - Tradition of “comprehensive national defence” tends to limit threat perception to threats that affect the public on a nation-wide scale</p> <p><b>FR</b> + Security as a symbol for crisis management in a broad sense, independent from the source of origin (such as natural, man-made and others)</p> <p><b>DE</b></p>	<p><b>AT</b> + Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy increases potential for national coordination</p> <p>+ Management of transversal issues happens on a regular basis in the framework of a steering committee with representatives from all relevant ministries that is regularly convened by the Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology as the owner of the national</p>

	<p>security centred on the norm of preserving state functioning and protecting market economy infrastructure/mechanisms</p> <p><b>NL</b> + Normative conviction that security is an all-societal affair and must rest on contributions from the national government, local governments, the business community, social organizations and citizens</p> <p><b>NO</b> + Internal security as national security, security of the "rikt"; multidimensional, multifunctional approach – not only confronting threats to citizens and infrastructure but threats to values of the nation, from democracy, health and territorial integrity up to economic security and cultural values</p> <p><b>ES</b> + Normative idea of national innovation by dedicating research to cross-cutting themes</p> <p><b>SE</b></p>	<p><b>DE</b> - Academic approach to security research, centred on the technological science dimension, limits thematic scope</p> <p><b>NL</b> + Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders</p> <p><b>ES</b> - Security mainly framed in terms of critical information and communication infrastructure</p> <p><b>SE</b> + National security research is understood as an instrument for improving conditions for participating in the EU's security research programme</p> <p><b>UK</b> + Combating terrorism is interpreted as a comprehensive task, including politics, public, technology, applied sciences and academia</p>	<p>+ Security as defence (Cold-war front state threat from outside and extremist threat from within) - security culture as such has been characterised by a relative separation of external and internal security</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b> - Very different concepts of security with different connotations; National security challenges are seen as symbolizing European challenges (e.g. illegal immigration and terrorism);streamlining/harmonization therefore is seen taking place at the interface between the national and the European level; Policy of alignment with European and international institutions; enhancement of national programmes and initiatives through European programmes and initiatives</p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b> + Homeland security symbolism favours science</p>	<p>security research programme</p> <p><b>FR</b></p> <p><b>DE</b> - Cold war front state legacy leads to an over-emphasis of civil protection practices</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b> + Commonwealth tradition facilitates sharing of experience and solutions with international partners</p> <p><b>NO</b> - Nurturing a culture of security, but only in the sector of critical information and communication technology</p> <p><b>IT</b> + Concern with organized crime promotes electronic surveillance and information management on the level of the national government</p>
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	<p>- The leading normative value for security policy and research is emergency management and information security/protection</p> <p><b>UK</b> + Inter-agency joined-up approach is a normative value, based on experience with administration in commonwealth and multiculturalism affairs</p> <p><b>IT</b> + Political norm of comprehensive risk assessment and management; coordinates local, regional and central/national authorities, technical and scientific experts and operational entities</p>	<p><b>NO</b> - Interpretation of security as information security</p> <p><b>IT</b> + Cognitive approach directed at comprehensive risk information and assessment, involving international import and export of scientific (technological) knowledge</p>	<p>and technology cooperation and critical infrastructure protection</p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <p><b>IT</b> + Internal security and public safety as national tasks, at the same time political culture is open towards an Europeanization of the security sector due to long experience with internationally acting organized crime</p>	
<p><b>Potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level</b></p>	<p><b>AT</b> + Tradition and legal provisions for “comprehensive national defence”</p> <p><b>FR</b></p> <p><b>DE</b> - Idea of national security and protection of own values</p>	<p><b>AT</b> - Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy limit the potential for developing shared European understandings</p> <p>- Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole</p> <p><b>FR</b></p>	<p><b>AT</b> - Tradition of “comprehensive national defence” tends to limit threat perception and preparedness to confront threats to the national level; European activities are expected to have immediate returns on national security</p> <p><b>FR</b></p>	<p><b>AT</b> + Domestic security (research) culture of coordination and pluralistic analysis and associated practices can help implement coordination on a European scale</p> <p><b>FR</b> + Practice of involvement in</p>

	<p>against challenges from within (normative response to totalitarian experience)</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p>- Establishing international linkages, but mainly in order to support industry participation in foreign (mainly U.S.) security research programmes</p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p>- Norm of reference is rather the U.S. than the EU context</p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <p>- Internal security as national security, security of the "riktet"</p> <p><b>IT</b></p>	<p>- Management of transversal issues confined to the idea of national security; comprehensive risk assessment and strategic foresight increasingly vested in the policing sector</p> <p><b>DE</b></p> <p>- Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole/as a government matter</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p>- Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders</p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p>+ Tendency to use EU institutions to promote own agenda and to seek support for own positions is limited by mistrust against other security cultures</p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p>+ National security research is understood as an instrument for improving conditions for participating in the EU's security research</p>	<p><b>DE</b></p> <p>- Idea of a protective state responsive to the specific security requirements of its citizens</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <p>- Information and infrastructure protection as a symbol of national security</p> <p><b>IT</b></p> <p>+ Internal security and public safety as national tasks, at the same time political culture is open towards an Europeanization of the security sector due to long experience with internationally acting organized crime</p>	<p>international mechanisms in fight against organized crime, seen as an opportunity to develop knowledge of global trends in crime and advocate own policies</p> <p><b>DE</b></p> <p>- Bundesländer-based competencies in the civil protection sector</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p>+ Practice of networking, establishment of international security networks and deems the national approach to be aligned of that of other nations and organizations</p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p>- Typically uses EU institutions to promote own agenda and to seek support for own positions. But limited by mistrust against other security cultures</p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p>+ Commonwealth tradition facilitates sharing of experience and solutions</p>
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		<p>programme</p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole/as a government matter</li> </ul> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Security seen as based on international standards/standardization</li> </ul> <p><b>IT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Cognitive approach directed at comprehensive risk information and assessment, involving international import and export of scientific (technological) knowledge</li> </ul>		<p>with international partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Tradition of permanent cooperation with partners in the fields of conventional crime/violence prevention and protection against terrorist attacks</li> </ul> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Nurturing a European culture of information security</li> </ul> <p><b>IT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Concern with organized crime promotes culture of information sharing</li> <li>- problem of implementing European practices into the action repertoires of national agencies with overlapping powers which are often difficult to coordinate</li> </ul>
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<p><b>Overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardization), including the improvement of coordination of national security research and</b></p>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordination approach based on a certain idea of national security</li> </ul> <p><b>FR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Sûreté tradition/culture supports a balanced approach between internal and international dimension and</li> </ul>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pluralistic approach, but focus on the national security space and on standardisation on the national level (e.g. common situation picture/assessment)</li> </ul> <p><b>FR</b></p> <p><b>DE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security interpreted as a task on</li> </ul>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security is seen as a national symbol</li> </ul> <p><b>FR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security is seen as a national symbol</li> </ul> <p><b>DE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security culture as such has been characterised by a</li> </ul>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <p><b>FR</b></p> <p><b>DE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cold war front state legacy leads to an over-emphasis of civil protection practices</li> </ul> <p><b>NL</b></p>
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<p><b>foresight activities with European-level research programmes</b></p>	<p>governance mechanisms</p> <p><b>DE</b> - National basis of threat assessment: European programme is not a substitute for member states' national programmes with their own focus and concentration on specific security requirements</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b> - Norm of reference is rather the U.S. than the EU context</p> <p><b>NO</b> - Internal security as national security, security of the "riktet"</p> <p><b>IT</b></p>	<p>the level of the state organization as a whole/as a government matter</p> <p><b>NL</b> - Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders</p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b> + National security research is understood as an instrument for improving conditions for participating in the EU's security research programme</p> <p><b>UK</b> + Combating terrorism is interpreted as a comprehensive task, including politics, public, technology, applied sciences and academia</p> <p><b>NO</b> - Security overly seen as based on international standards/standardization + Security research aimed to contribute to Europeanization/internationalization of information security</p> <p><b>IT</b> + Cognitive approach directed at</p>	<p>relative separation of external and internal security; European efforts are concentrated on the ESDP dimensions of security</p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b> - Very different concepts of security with different connotations; National security challenges are seen as symbolizing European challenges (e.g. illegal immigration and terrorism);streamlining/harmonization therefore is seen taking place at the interface between the national and the European level</p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <p><b>IT</b></p>	<p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b> + Establishing international linkages in order to support industry participation in foreign security research programmes</p> <p><b>UK</b> + Tradition of permanent cooperation with partners in the fields of conventional crime/violence prevention and protection against terrorist attacks</p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <p><b>IT</b> + Importing and exporting technical-scientific knowledge for comprehensive risk assessment</p>
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		comprehensive risk information and assessment, involving international import and export of scientific (technological) knowledge		
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<p><b>Overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour technological solutions to security problems)</b></p>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Traditional value of “comprehensive national defence” favours technological solutions and prevention, risking gaps in the field of (governance and coordination of) crisis reaction/response</li> </ul>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology as the owner of the national security research programme favours technology themes; security research politically seen as opening up a security market for domestic enterprises and industries</li> </ul>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <p><b>FR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Security as a symbol for crisis management in a broad sense, independent from the source of origin (such as natural, man-made and others)</li> </ul>	<p><b>AT</b></p> <p><b>FR</b></p> <p><b>DE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cold war front state legacy leads to an over-emphasis of civil protection practices</li> </ul>
	<p><b>FR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal security as a general concept in the context of sûreté which is meant to be a guarantee for exercising liberties and rights</li> </ul> <p><b>DE</b></p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Normative idea of national innovation by dedicating research to cross-cutting themes</li> </ul> <p><b>SE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Culture of security awareness links</li> </ul>	<p><b>FR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sûreté tradition/culture causes on overemphasis on the societal (as opposed to the technical) dimension</li> </ul> <p><b>DE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole/as a government matter in the sense of civil protection</li> </ul> <p><b>NL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders</li> </ul>	<p><b>DE</b></p> <p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Homeland security symbolism favours science and technology cooperation and critical infrastructure protection</li> </ul> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Critical information and communication infrastructure as a cultural symbol of national security</li> </ul>	<p><b>NL</b></p> <p><b>ES</b></p> <p><b>SE</b></p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nurturing a culture of security in the sector of critical information and communication technology</li> </ul> <p><b>IT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Importing and exporting technical-scientific knowledge for comprehensive risk assessment</li> <li>- Practical concern with organized crime promotes</li> </ul>

	<p>technological with societal (e.g. education) factors/instruments</p> <p><b>UK</b></p> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Culture of security (prevention) in the sector of critical information and communication technology is a leading value for security (research) policy making</li> </ul> <p><b>IT</b></p>	<p><b>ES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security (research) mainly interpreted in terms of science and technology</li> </ul> <p><b>SE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security often interpreted as crisis management in the sense of civil protection and emergency management</li> <li>+ Association of low a rate of poverty and social exclusion with a high crime rate makes security awareness a significant issue</li> </ul> <p><b>UK</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Combating terrorism is interpreted as a comprehensive task, including politics, public, technology, applied sciences and academia</li> </ul> <p><b>NO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security commonly interpreted as information security</li> </ul> <p><b>IT</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cognitive approach directed at comprehensive risk information and assessment, but centred on the scientific (technological)</li> </ul>	<p><b>IT</b></p>	<p>electronic surveillance/concentration on technological solutions</p>
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		dimension		
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**Matrix 2: Overall assessment of evidence for the four big cultural factors (integration of country-related ratings from matrix 1)**

	Cultural factors (can) reduce gap / are part of the solution				Cultural factors produce gap / are part of the problem			
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Potential for a comprehensive approach at the national level	AT, FR, NL, NO, ES, IT, UK	AT, FR, NL, SE, UK, IT	FR, DE, UK, IT	AT, IT, UK	DE, SE	DE, ES, NO	AT, ES	DE, NO
	7	6	4	3	2	3	2	2
Potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level	AT	IT, NO, SE, ES	IT	AT, FR, IT, NL, NO, UK	DE, NO, SE, UK	AT, FR, DE, NL, UK	AT, DE, NO	DE, IT, ES
	1	4	1	6	4	5	3	3
Overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardization), including the improvement of coordination of national security research and foresight activities with European-level research programmes	FR	IT, NO, SE, UK		SE, UK, IT	AT, DE, UK, NO	AT, DE, NL, NO	AT, FR, DE, ES	DE
	1	4	1	3	4	4	4	1
Overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour technological solutions to security	SE, ES	NL, SE, UK	FR		AT, FR, NO	AT, FR, DE, ES, SE, NO, IT	UK, NO	DE, NO, IT

problems								
	2	3	1	-	3	7	2	3
<b>Sum</b>	11	17	7	12	13	19	11	9

**Matrix 3: Cultural factor/model for which most evidence was found per country**

Country	Main factor(s) reducing gaps	Main factor(s) producing gaps
AT	I / Normative values IV / Action repertories	II / Knowledge/Interpretation III / Common symbols
FR	I / Normative values III / Common symbols	II / Knowledge/Interpretation
DE	III / Common symbols	II / Knowledge/Interpretation IV / Action repertories
ES	I / Normative values	II / Knowledge/Interpretation III / Common symbols
IT	II / Knowledge/Interpretation IV/ Action repertories	IV / Action repertories
NL	II / Knowledge/Interpretation	
NO	II / Knowledge/Interpretation	
SE	II / Knowledge/Interpretation	I / Normative values
UK	II / Knowledge/Interpretation IV / Action repertories	I / Normative values
<b>Mode</b>	II / Knowledge/Interpretation	


**Matrix 4: Cultural factor summarized evidence of impact on the four types of gap, per country**

Country	Comprehensive approach at national level	Comprehensive approach at European level	Lack of comparable security strategies and approaches to governance	Split in thematic thrust	Sum of overall cultural effect on gaps
AT	+	0	-	-	--
FR	+	0	0	-	0

<b>DE</b>	-	-	-	-	----
<b>ES</b>	-	0	-	0	-
<b>IT</b>	+	+	+	-	++
<b>NL</b>	+	0	-	+	+
<b>NO</b>	-	0	-	-	----
<b>SE</b>	0	0	+	+	++
<b>UK</b>	+	-	+	0	+
<b>Sum</b>	++	-	--	---	----

Majority of related entries in matrix 2;

“+” positive (part of solution), “-” negative (part of problem), “0” neutral evidence of summarized impact of all four cultural factors on type of gap



## Appendix B: Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions

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### A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis

This datasheet contains the results of a secondary analysis of relevant Standard EUROBAROMETER opinion poll data from the CPSI case study countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), compared to the EU average (EU-15/EU-25/EU-27 as applicable). Crime as a national and a European concern of EU citizens is followed over the past five years (2003-2007), on the basis of poll data provided by the respective autumn EUROBAROMETER surveys.<sup>90</sup>

“Crime” is understood here as domestic crime with a focus on neighbourhood safety, and EUROBAROMETER items were picked accordingly. Timeline comparison is limited by the fact that not all relevant items are reflected in each EUROBAROMETER. Specific information on this analytical constraint is provided with each of the following tables.

On the basis of correlations, hypotheses about sources of citizens’ fear of crime in the seven focus countries are developed and cross-checked for plausibility.

#### General explanation

green = country value is below EU average

red = country value is above EU average

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<sup>90</sup> *Standard Eurobarometer 60*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2003, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb60/eb60\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb60/eb60_en.htm); *Standard Eurobarometer 62*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2004, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm); *Standard Eurobarometer 64*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2005, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htm); *Standard Eurobarometer 66*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2006, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.htm); *Standard Eurobarometer 68*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_en.htm). Data are taken from the respective full report and, where necessary, its appendices.

**Table 1: “Crime” as a concern of citizens on the national level – among the two most important issues according to EUROBAROMETER (EB), over time (fall editions) [%]**

	Change 2003/ 2007 (in %)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
EB no.		60	62	64	66	68
Q no.		2.1	33	30	23	6a
AT	-46	28	24	14	12	15
BG	-8	-	25	24	25	23
FR	-43	30	27	26	29	17
DE	-17	18	18	11	13	15
IT	18	28	23	25	25	33
NL	-36	52	30	32	24	33
SE	-9	32	35	31	23	29
UK	-8	48	27	41	34	44
EU	-14	28*	24**	24**	23**	24***

\*) EU-15

\*\*\*) EU-25

\*\*\*\*) EU-27

**Table 2: Locus of decision-making and action in crime fighting (national/EU [%]) according to EUROBAROMETER (EB), over time (fall editions)**

	Majority for/ against EU Ø(2005-2007)	2003 ° EU-15	2004° EU-25	2005	2006	2007
EB no.		60	62	64	66	68
Q no.		8.5	35	31	24	20a
AT	EU+	47/49	46/48	35/61	41/55	36/62
BG	EU+	-	-	39/55	43/52	28/64

FR	EU	67/30	70/26	45/52	50/48	46/53
DE	EU+	63/33	77/20	29/69	26/73	20/79
IT	EU	57/37	58/36	33/63	32/64	26/66
NL	EU	78/21	84/15	31/68	36/64	33/66
SE	NAT-	76/21	81/17	54/44	62/36	44/55
UK	NAT-	75/21	74/21	65/33	69/28	62/34
<b>EU</b>	EU	63/33*	64/32**	38/59**	38/59**	36/61***

<sup>o</sup>) Item is specific and refers to urban crime prevention; this item has been dismissed from 2005 on in favour of a general “fight against crime” item.

\*) EU-15

\*\*\*) EU-25

\*\*\*\*) EU-27

**Table 3: r (2005-2007) Crime as a concern of citizens on the national level and in favour of national decision-making (HYP: National locus of successful intervention)**

AT	0.84	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
BG	0.97	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
FR	0.52	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
DE	0.81	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
IT	-0.46	Citizens desire European solutions for national security problems
NL	0.51	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
SE	0.49	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
UK	-0.26	r too low to interpret
<b>EU</b>	0.63	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems

→ **Citizens perceive national interventions to be most suitable to enhance their security against crime**

**Table 4: r (2005-2007) Crime as a concern of citizens on the national level and in favour of EU decision-making (HYP: European locus of successful intervention)**

AT	-0.81	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
BG	-0.96	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
FR	-0.55	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
DE	-0.81	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
IT	0.37	Citizens desire European solutions for national security problems
NL	-0.51	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
SE	-0.48	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
UK	0.29	r rather low to interpret
EU	-0.63	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems

→ The EU is generally not perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime

**Table 5: European Union means more crime according to EUROBAROMETER (EB), over time (fall editions) [%] (“What does the European Union mean to you personally?”)**

	2003 EU-15	2004	2005	2006	2007
EB no.	60	62	64	-	-
Q no.	6.2	16	13	-	-
AT	34	46	44	Item not contained	Item not contained
BG	-	6	6		
FR	12	11	12		
DE	33	40	36		
IT	8	12	13		
NL	22	22	25		
SE	35	33	35		

UK	10	8	12		
EU	16*	18**	18**		

\*) EU-15

\*\*) EU-25

\*\*) EU-27

**Table 6: r (2003-2005) Does perception of crime as a problem on the national level correlate with the perception that the European Union means more crime? (HYP: EU is locus of fear of crime in the own country)**

AT	-0.61	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of crime is externalized (high perception of crime as product of the EU is associated with low perception of crime as a national problem) → does not support HYP
BG	--	Insufficient survey data
FR	0.28	Citizens tend to perceive national crime and EU crime as the same; fear of crime is Europeanizing → supports HYP
DE	0.08	r value does not support interpretation
IT	-0.83	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of crime is internalized/nationalized (low perception of crime as product of the EU is associated with high perception of crime as a national problem) → does not support HYP
NL	-0.43	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of EU-inferred and national crime seems to be mutually reinforcing (both perception of crime as a product of the EU and perception of crime as a national problem are over-average) → does not support HYP
SE	-0.97	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of EU-inferred and national crime seems to be mutually reinforcing (both perception of crime as a product of the EU and perception of crime as a national problem are over-average) → does not support HYP
UK	0.65	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as the same while making under-average EU-blaming (see table 5); fear of crime is Europeanized → supports HYP
EU	-1.00	EU citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as totally distinct and on average perceive crime either as a national or as a European problem → does not support HYP

**→ The EU is generally not a source of citizen fear of crime**

**Table 7: r (2003-2005) EU means more crime and in favour of national decision-making (Reinforcement of EU locus of fear of crime HYP)**

AT	-0.43	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
BG	--	insufficient survey data
FR	-0.59	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
DE	<b>0.36</b>	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with more favour of national decision-making → citizens perceive a certain amount of crime to be caused by the EU, so the EU is a cause of fear of crime
IT	-0.63	Perception of crime as EU-based is strongly associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
NL	-0.99	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
SE	-0.64	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
UK	-0.82	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → adaptation of HYP in the light of table 6 UK figure: EU is perceived as cause of crime, but EU-caused crime is supposed to be solved at EU level
EU	-0.47	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP

**→ The EU is generally not a source of citizen fear of crime**

## Appendix C: Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security

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### Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on national level

This data sheet presents a sum-up of empirical criminological statistical findings (based on indicators testable by means of opinion polls and interviews) associated with felt vs. factual security and factors causing feeling of insecurity, as exemplified by fear of crime. In its last part, it derives testable hypotheses for further empirical work in the CPSI public opinion work package and for the validation study. These hypotheses cover “causes of fear of crime” (also in relation to actual security) and “social effectiveness criteria for security technologies” (with CCTV as example).

A general problem with related empirical data is scope and timeliness. The scope is typically limited in the sense that criminological data the same is the case for public opinion/fear of crime data) are not collected in every country in a comparable fashion and often represent hot-spots (such as large urban areas). Criminological data on national levels as well as on a European/international level become available three to four years time-lagged.

Our main sources for indicators for actual security is the *European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice*,<sup>i</sup> volume 3 (1996),<sup>ii</sup> covering the period 2000-2003. Only the announced volume 4, to be published in 2009 after the conclusion of this study, will cover up to the year 2007.

The *International Crime Victims Survey* (ICVS)<sup>iii</sup> currently covers the years up to 2004/05 (ICVS-5); it is relevant because it has data aggregated on the country level. ICVS-6 is prepared for 2009.

The *European Crime and Safety Survey* (EU ICS),<sup>iv</sup> a consortium sponsored by DG RTD under FP6-SSP-2002-1, produced survey data and capital, regional as well as national maps based on field work in 2005. It covers a range of issues associated with citizens' perceptions of security, including classical items such as “feeling (un)safe when walking in dark”. EU ICS data are included in this paper. The Full Report is available online.<sup>v</sup>

The reporting on criminal justice statistics in this paper includes other trusted sources in order to allow comparisons of aggregated national data and set a baseline for factual and for perceived security data for further analysis.

The *European Forum for Urban Safety*<sup>vi</sup> was chosen as the basic source for the empirical country profiling presented in this paper. It collects both qualitative and quantitative national-level data on factual and felt security in European countries. All statistical values in the subsequent matrix are from *European Forum of Urban Safety* country profiles<sup>vii</sup> if not otherwise stated. Country profiles missing on the European Forum for Urban Safety were substituted by data from *NationMaster*.<sup>viii</sup> NationMaster is massive central data source to compare nations, based on a vast compilation of data from such sources as the CIA World Factbook, UN, and OECD.

Other sources include the *Standard EUROBAROMETER*,<sup>ix</sup> secondary analysis of which are reported on a larger scale in Appendix C. The EUROBAROMETER is especially useful for tracking changes in citizens' perceived security over time. There have been two relevant *Special EUROBAROMETERS*: The first is *Europeans and Public Security* (1996)<sup>x</sup> (based on a selection of items from the *International Crime Victims*

Survey – ICVS – 1996), on the eve of the establishment of the Area of Justice, Liberty and Security in the EU Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which is too long ago to be included in the present secondary analysis. However, this Special EUROBAROMETER contains relevant hypothetical conclusions about sources of citizens' fear of crime, focused on street crime,<sup>xi</sup> which can be the basis of further work and are also reported in Appendix C. The second is *Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* (2003)<sup>xii</sup> with original opinion survey data from 2002. Criminological sources as described here offer more timely data so that this Special EUROBAROMETER will also be considered on a subsidiary basis.

On a case-by case basis, evidence from the *URBANEYE*<sup>xiii</sup> project on public CCTV acceptance and research on cultural factors of national security perceptions conducted within Working Group 10 (Governance and Coordination) of the *European Security Research and Innovation Forum* (ESRIF) are taken into account.<sup>xiv</sup>

#### Empirical country profile matrix

based on latest available information (2003-2008) on

*European Forum for Urban Safety*, <http://www.urbansecurity.org>

*NationMaster*, <http://www.nationmaster.com>

*European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS)*, <http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu>

*Standard EUROBAROMETER* and relevant *Special EUROBAROMETERs*, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion)

*International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS)*, <http://www.rechten.ut.nl/icvc>

*European Sourcebook of Criminal Justice (ESB)*, <http://www.europeansourcebook.org>

*URBANEYE*, <http://www.urbaneye.net>

*European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF)*, Working Group 10 (Governance and Coordination), <http://www.esrif.eu>

		AT	BG <sup>xv</sup>	DE	FR <sup>xvi</sup>	IT <sup>xvii</sup>	NL <sup>xviii</sup>	SE	GB (Engl.+Wales)	Arithmetic mean
0	Citizens' general feeling of safety <sup>xix</sup>	79%	n/a	65%	66%	56%	78%	79%	57% (all UK)	64%
1	ICVS victimization level <sup>xx</sup>	low	n/a	average	low	average	high	average	high	n/a
2	Offences (reported to police) per 100.000 population and % change 2000-2003 <sup>xxi</sup>	7.881 +14% average	1.729 -2% below average	7.976 +5% average	6.605 +4% below average	4.236 +11% below average	8.530 +4% above average	13.995 +3% above average	11.241 n/a above average	7.774 (8 country average)

3	ICVS personal fear of crime level <sup>xxii</sup>	low (20%)	high (57.5%)	low (26.5%)	average (29.5%)	high (39%)	low (18%)	low (18%)	average (33.5%)	8 countries (32.5%)
4	Relation between felt (line 3) and actual (line 1) personal security indicator	realistic perception of security/realistic perception of crime risk	n/a	overperception of security/underperception of crime risk	underperception of security/overperception of crime risk	underperception of security/overperception of crime risk	overperception of security/underperception of crime risk	overperception of security/underperception of crime risk	overperception of security/underperception of crime risk	
5	National social fear of crime level <sup>xxiii</sup>	average (24%)	average (25%)	low (18%)	average (27%)	low (23%)	high (30%)	high (35%)	average (27%)	8 countries (26.1%)
6	Relationship between felt societal security (line 5) and actual security (line 1)	social overfear	n/a	social underfear	social overfear	social underfear	realistic social fear	social overfear	social underfear	
7	Relationship between felt societal security (line 5) and felt personal security (line 2) level	social > personal fear level social fear culture	n/a	social = personal fear level balanced fear culture	social = personal fear level balanced fear culture	social < personal fear level personal fear culture	social > personal fear level social fear culture	social > personal fear level social fear culture	social = personal fear level balanced fear culture	
9	CCTV acceptance (public support in capital city) <sup>xxiv</sup>	45,5%		56%					94,40%	
10	Technology as threat/source of insecurity or as a solution <sup>xxv</sup>	Threat		Solution	Threat	Solution	Threat	Solution	Solution	
11	Police penetration per 100.000	323	310	303 <sup>xxvi</sup>	408	556	192	185	205	310
12	Main offences ranked (based on reporting to police)	Theft Vehicle theft Assault	Theft/Robbery Transport and communication crimes	Theft Fraud Damage to Property	Theft People offences Economic		Bicycle theft Vandalism of cars	Violent crime Theft of a motor	Theft Criminal damage (vandalism) Violence against	

		Sexual violence Homicide	Crimes against governance (esp. illegal crossing of boundary) Drug-related crimes	Assault / Bodily injury Drug related crime	offences Drug-related infractions			vehicle Domestic Burglary Robbery Drug trafficking	persons Burglary Fraud	
13	Trust in police <sup>xxvii</sup>	81% (54%, 1996)	53% (n/a)	74% (n/a)	60% (65%)	65% <sup>xxviii</sup> (50%, 1992)	70% <sup>xxix</sup> (52%)	65% <sup>xxx</sup> (61%)	75% <sup>xxx1</sup> (72%)	ICVS/EU ICS 70% (65%)
14	Perception of home security indicator (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) <sup>xxxii</sup>	21% (13%, 1996)	31% (n/a)	23% (n/a)	38% (44%)	43% (38%, 1992)	18% (19%)	17% (16%)	35% (33%)	ICVS/EU ICS 29% (31%)
15	Perception of street security indicator (feeling <b>unsafe</b> when walking in dark) <sup>xxxiii</sup>	19% (20%, 1996)	53% (n/a)	30% (n/a)	21% (22%)	35% (35%, 1992)	18% (18%)	19% (15%)	32% (26%)	ICVS/EU ICS 27% (22%)
16	Minors percentage (under 18)	10.2%	10.3%	12.2%	19.9%	n/a	n/a	25%	27%	
17	Foreigners percentage	30.0%	1.4% (2004)	22.0%	19.5%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
18	Main debates	Domestic violence Trafficking and illegal immigration Prevention of drug addiction	Political crime and corruption Organized crime/violence Weaknesses of the judiciary Violence during sport	Child Abuse and Domestic violence Violence against foreigners /migrants motivated	Youth delinquency Role of city majors in policing/ criminal justice Road safety				Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) Terrorism (in the light of July 2005 terrorist attacks in London)	

		<p>and drug related crime</p> <p>Violence in the media</p> <p>Violence in schools</p> <p>EU enlargement and Schengen</p>	<p>events (hooliganism, police action)</p> <p>Domestic and sexual violence towards women</p> <p>Rights of victims of violence</p>	<p>by racism, right-wing, xenophobia and/or anti-Semitism</p> <p>Violence in schools</p> <p>Trafficking in human beings</p>	<p>Specialised prevention (mediators, street educators)</p> <p>Sharing of information between the justice, the police</p>				<p>Racism and Hate Crimes (considering large increase, doubled since 2000)</p>	
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19	Political initiatives/ National action plans	<p>Platform against Violence in the Family (1993)</p> <p>National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (2003)</p> <p>Action Plan against Child Abuse and Child Pornography on the Internet (1998)</p> <p>Young rights Action Plan (2003)</p> <p>Crime Victims Assistance Act (1972)</p> <p>Protection against Domestic Violence Act (1997)</p>	<p>National Strategy for Counteracting Crime (2002 - 2005)</p> <p>National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2001-2004)</p> <p>Countering Trafficking in Human Beings (2003)</p> <p>Domestic violence (2003)</p> <p>Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (2003)</p> <p>Combating Sport and Football Hooliganism (2003)</p> <p>National strategy on prevention and counteracting the antisocial behaviour and the offences of minors and juveniles (2003)</p>	<p>National action plan: The Standing Conference of Ministers of the Interior approved a joint programme on internal security in 1974, which has been continued in 1998</p> <p>Partnership structures at the regional level: In 2002 the <i>Länder</i> governments set up a Working Group on the Prevention of Violence</p>	<p>Crime prevention organized on the local level</p> <p>National action plan: co-operation between several secretaries: Home affairs, defence, justice, education, labour, urban policy</p>	<p>Provisions for the coordination of public security and local police forces, and for integrated security polices</p>		<p>Domestic Violence: Crime and Victims Bill (April 2005)</p> <p>Sexual offences Act (2003)</p> <p>A new deal for victims and witnesses strategy (July 2003)</p> <p>Crime and Disorder Act (1999)</p> <p>Football Disorder Act (2000)</p> <p>The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act established partnerships between the police, local authorities, probation service, health authorities, the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses.</p>	
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## Statistical analysis, interpretation and development of testable hypotheses

Correlations of values in the Empirical country profile matrix (line no. given in brackets)

(a) Actual insecurity (by amount of crime reported to police) (5)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Perceived societal insecurity (crime as a problem “out there”) (2)	.57	More crime is associated with higher perceived societal insecurity <b>Hypothesis:</b> Actual insecurity increases societal fear of crime.
Perceived personal insecurity (crime as an individual concern) (= ICVS National personal fear of crime level) (3)	-.77	More crime is associated with lower perceived personal security <b>Hypothesis:</b> Actual insecurity decreases personal fear of crime.

(b) Trust in police (13)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of street crime (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) (15)	-.54	Feeling unsafe when walking in dark is associated with lower trust in police; trust in police lowers perception of insecurity. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Trust-building interventions (such as community policing) reduce citizens’ fear of crime.
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of home-related crime (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	-.37	Perceived likeliness of burglary is associated with lower trust in police; trust in police lowers perception of insecurity. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Trust-building interventions (such as community policing) reduce citizens’ fear of crime.
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	.40	Victimization (by means of reported offences) is positively associated with trust in police. <b>Hypothesis:</b> More trust in police leads to more reporting of offences, thus increasing reported crime rates without a necessary increase in victimization levels. However, more victimization (reported offences) could bring more trust in police (which in the light of offence reporting may be perceived as a problem-solver).

Police penetration (11)	-.25	Higher police penetration is lightly associated with lower trust in police; higher trust in police is associated with lower penetration. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Police can use penetration as a response to lack of public trust.
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
(c) Police penetration (11)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	-.61	Higher police penetration is associated with less reported offences; more offences are associated with less police penetration. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Police-penetration enhancing interventions such as community policing reduce crime rates, thus increasing factual security. Less policing causes more crime.
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of street crime (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) (15)	.26	Higher policy penetration is lightly associated with higher perception of insecurity/fear for street crime. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Police penetration (visibility of police) is a moderate cause of citizen’s fear of street crime.
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of home-related crime (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	.74	Higher policy penetration is heavily associated with higher perception of insecurity/fear for burglary. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Police penetration (visibility of police) is a cause of citizen fear of home-related crime. Citizens perceive intervention strategies (such as community policing) that include making police visible and touchable as response to, as opposed to prevention of, home-related crime, thus increasing fear perception in this sector.
		<b>Hypothesis:</b> Increased police penetration reduces (reported) crime but increases citizens perception of insecurity. This effect is stronger for home-related crime than for street crime.

<b>(d) Perception of insecurity indicator – street crime (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) (15)</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>Explanation and interpretation</b>
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of home-related crime (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	.47	Fear of street crime and fear of home crime are positively associated with one another. <b>Hypothesis:</b> [Direction of influence determined by path analysis]
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	-.68	More reported offences are associated with lower perception of insecurity indicator; result is counterintuitive. Association is higher than in the case of home-related crime. <b>Hypothesis:</b> Reported offences increase citizens’ perceptions of street security; as increase in reported offences is also associated with increase of trust in police, belief in effective state authorities’ intervention reduces fear of crime. Low rate of reported offences increases fear of crime and reduces trust in police – probably because it lowers citizens’ belief in effective state authorities’ intervention. However, results could also be due to the effect of “if the others get the crime, we won’t get it” reported in literature for “distant” crime. <sup>xxxiv</sup>

(e) Perception of insecurity indicator – home (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	-.52	<p>More reported offences are associated with lower perception of insecurity indicator; result is counterintuitive. Association is lower than in the case of home-related crime.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis:</b> Reported offences increase citizens' perceptions of security; as increase in reported offences is also associated with increase of trust in police, belief in effective state authorities' intervention can be expected to reduce fear of crime. Low rate of reported offences increases fear of crime and reduces trust in police – probably because it lowers citizens' belief in effective state authorities' intervention. However, results could also be due to the effect of “if the others get crime, we don't get it” reported in literature.<sup>xxxv</sup> Lower r value than in case of street crime can be interpreted as evidence for the public authority efficiency hypothesis, because according to it, public space-related crime has stronger impact on trust in interventions than home-related crime.</p>

Path models

The following draft causal models were developed for further research to consistently integrate the maximum of the hypothesis as derived from the correlations. A first-draft statistical path model conception was then undertaken, yielding the following path coefficients:



According to the results of this tentative path analysis, the hypotheses can be assessed as follows:

	Hypothesis	Result of path analysis	Contradicts/needs to be checked against hypothesis no.
1	Trust-building interventions such as community policing reduce citizens' fear of crime	Hypothesis needs to be <b>differentiated</b> : Trust-building interventions such as community policing reduce citizens' fear of street crime but have no significant effect on fear of home-related crime	2, 10
2	More trust in police leads to more reporting of offences, thus increasing reported crime rates without a necessary increase in victimization levels	Hypothesis needs to be <b>amended</b> : The bigger the trust in police, the more offences are reported, and this increases fear of crime Interpretation and <b>follow-up hypothesis</b> : Through this causal path, interventions (such as community policing) that increase trust in police may indirectly increase fear of crime	1, 4, 5, 6
3	More reported offences increase trust in police (which in the light of offence reporting may be perceived as a problem-solver)	Not tested in the models, but <b>affirmative evidence</b> (see hypothesis 10)	
4	Belief in effective state authorities' intervention reduces fear of crime	<b>Reinforced</b>	2
5	Lower rate of reported offences (a) <b>increases</b> fear of crime and (b) <b>reduces trust in police</b> (probably because it lowers citizens' belief in effective state authorities' intervention)	(a) <b>Reinforced</b> (b) Not tested in the path models, but <b>affirmative evidence</b> (see hypotheses 3 and 19)	11, 13
6	Police-penetration enhancing interventions such as community policing reduce crime rates (reported offences), thus increasing factual security	<b>Reinforced</b>	2
7	Less policing causes more crime	Not tested in the path models	9

8	Police penetration (visibility of police) is a moderate cause of citizens' general fear of street crime	<b>Rejected:</b> Police penetration reduces fear of street crime	
9	Police penetration (visibility of police) is a cause of citizens' fear of home-related crime	<b>Strongly reinforced</b>	7
10	Increased police penetration reduces (reported) crime but increases citizens' perception of insecurity (fear of crime)	<p><b>Reinforced for fear of crime in general</b> (see also hypothesis 5);</p> <p><b>Rejected for fear of home-related crime:</b> no causal effect</p> <p><b>Rejected for fear of street crime:</b> Police penetration increases number of reported offences, and this increased number <b>reduces</b> fear of street crime. Provides affirmative evidence for hypothesis 3</p>	1
11	Actual insecurity (reported offences) <b>increases</b> citizens' perceptions of insecurity (fear of crime)	<p><b>Hypothesis needs to be differentiated:</b></p> <p>Decrease in actual security (more offences) <b>increases general fear of crime</b></p> <p>Decrease in actual security (more offences) <b>strongly reduces</b> citizens' <b>fear of street crime</b>. <b>This contradicts earlier survey research</b><sup>xxxvi</sup></p> <p>Decrease in actual security (more offences) <b>increases or leaves unchanged</b> citizens' fear of <b>home-related crime</b></p>	5
12	Fear of street crime causes fear of home crime	<b>Hypothesis developed through path analysis</b>	16

### Qualitative findings: Citizen security cultures by indicators

The following table shows qualitative configurations of similarities/differences between the countries of the matrix above, reflecting relevant of its figures. “1” means over-average, “0” average and “-” under-average. Colours mark similar values/configurations.

	AT	BG	DE	FR	IT <sup>xxxvii</sup>	NL	SE	UK <sup>xxxviii</sup> (data for England and Wales)
<b>Tentative typology of citizen security culture</b> Personal fear : victimization <u>and</u> social fear : victimization <u>and</u> crime rate : perception of crime as a prior problem according to EURO-BAROMETER <sup>xxxix</sup> over time	Realistic fear of crime  Social fear culture	Overfear  Personal fear culture	Underfear  Balanced personal/social fear culture	Overfear  Balanced personal/social fear culture	(scattered; in sum close to realistic fear of crime)  Personal fear culture	Between underfear and realistic fear of crime  Social fear of crime culture	Unbalanced  Social fear of crime culture	Underfear  Balanced personal/social fear culture
Victimization (line 1 in the table above)	-	0	0	-	0	+	0	+
Over/under-average offences per 100.000 population (line 2)	0	-	0	-	-	+	+	+
Personal fear of crime level (line 3)	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	0
Personal fear : victimization (line 4)	0	n/a	-	+	+	-	-	-
Social fear of crime level (line 5)	0	0	-	0	-	+	+	0
Social fear : victimization (line 6)	+	n/a	-	+	-	0	+	-
Relationship between felt societal security and felt personal security level (line 7)	social personal >	n/a	social personal =	social personal =	social personal <	social > personal	social personal >	social = personal
Public debates centred on ... security (line 18 compared to line 12)	perceived	actual	perceived	actual	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual

Policy interventions based on ... security (line 19 compared to line 12)	actual	perceived	perceived	perceived	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
CCTV acceptance (public support in capital) (line 9); missing ratings substituted by quantitative evidence from CPSI country case studies	-	n/a	0	-	+	n/a	n/a	+
Technology as threat/ source of insecurity or as a solution (line 10)	Threat		Solution	Threat	Solution	Threat	Solution	Solution

This qualitative matrix allows for following tentative conclusions as input for further research:

Causes of fear of crime

Which factors are present in high-fear of crime countries that are not present in other countries?

High social fear of crime countries (crime perceived as a problem “out there”) have under-average personal fear of crime, but an over-average number of offences reported to police (low actual security). Personal fear of crime is also lower than the victimization level would suggest.

High personal fear of crime countries (crime perceived as an individual/-ized problem) can have average victimization levels. They have an under-average number of offences reported to police (high actual security) and average or under-average social fear of crime. Personal fear of crime is thus more detached from actual security than social fear of crime. More social fear of crime is associated with less personal fear of crime. This leads to the hypothesis that social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime.

	Hypothesis		Contradicts/needs to be checked against hypothesis no.
13	Actual insecurity increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem “out there”)	Reinforced by quantitative analysis of extreme groups	5
14	Actual insecurity decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern)	Reinforced by quantitative analysis of extreme groups	

15	Actual insecurity causes social fear of crime and at the same time reduces personal fear of crime		
16	Social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime		12

### Realistic vs. constructed fear of crime

A good matching between crime rate/main offences (line 12 in the matrix) and public debates (line 18) can either be evidence of a reflective/responsive public debate and realistic fear of crime or of poor preventive effect of risk communication. A good matching exists in France. Sufficient matching exists in Bulgaria and the UK.

A poor matching between crime rate/main offences and public debates can either be evidence of a non-responsive public debate and unrealistic or (e.g. media-)constructed fear of crime or of good preventive effect of risk communication. A poor matching exists in Austria and Germany.

Matching of political initiatives (line 19) with crime rate/main offences (line 12) or public debates (line 18) can give a hint, to be followed by further analysis, if public interventions are more directed at actual or perceived security issues:

- In Austria and the UK, interventions are more directed at actual security issues.
- In Bulgaria, France and Germany, interventions are more directed at perceived security issues.
- Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden could not be classified due to lack of relevant information in the table.

### Summary of evidenced causes of/predictors for fear of crime

(includes results from Annex 2: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”)

- Victimization: Actual (in-)security by rate of reported offences (lower rate **increases** fear of crime; does not apply to street crime)
- Differentiation by type of fear: Actual insecurity causes social fear of crime and at the same time reduces personal fear of crime
- Gender: Women express feelings of insecurity to a far greater degree than men
- Age: Feelings of insecurity are more common among the over-55 age-group and least common among the younger parts of the population
- Trust in police (reduces fear of crime)
- Police penetration (increases fear of home-related crime, but reduces fear of street crime)
- Fear of street crime (causes fear of home crime)

The EU is generally not a source of citizen fear of crime; exceptions are France, Germany and the UK

Specific causes/predictors for fear of street crime:

- Political/societal transition

- Social vulnerability (exposure to actual violence in combination with limited resources to deal with the economic consequences of victimization)
- Income: Lower income is associated with more street crime (reinforces the social vulnerability hypothesis)
- Occupation: Respondents in the managerial category, expressed the lowest feelings of insecurity as for street crime and house persons the highest; persons with a managerial occupation least believed that more policing can reduce crime, whereas house persons most believed so.
- Actual security by rate of reported offences (higher rate **reduces** fear of street crime)
- Gender (female)
- Urbanization/Place of residence. This could be an artefact as fear of crime is typically operationalized by survey items referring to urban scenarios (“feeling fear when walking in the dark” and others)
- Trust in local authorities (reduces fear of street crime)
- Age (older citizens more often feel unsafe in their own area)
- Presence of local drugs scenes
- Trust-building interventions such as community policing (reduce fear of street crime)

**Acceptance of technological solutions for security problems (example: CCTV acceptance)**

CPSI case countries in sum show *no* consistent association between acceptance of CCTV and relationship between level of societal and of personal fear of crime, level of victimization, relationship between felt and actual personal/social security and victimization.

They however show consistent association between acceptance of CCTV and cultural attitudes towards technology: Countries in which technology is interpreted as part of the security problem (e.g. critical infrastructure protection, information technology as object of offence and source of insecurity), public CCTV acceptance is lower than in countries where technology is interpreted as part of the solution (e.g. information technology as a foundation for coordinated, efficient prevention and response).

	<b>Hypothesis</b>	
17	(Citizen security culture) Acceptance of technological solutions for security problems does <b>not</b> depend on the country’s citizen security perception tendency (social under-/overfear as compared to crime rate, personal fear of crime and social fear of crime)	To be tested by further research
18	(Technology culture) Acceptance of technological solutions for security problems is less influenced by the security problem than by general attitudes towards technology	To be tested by further research

- i <http://www.europeansourcebook.org>.
- ii [http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3\\_Full.pdf](http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3_Full.pdf).
- iii <http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs>; Result report: J.J.M. Van Dijk/J.N. van Kesteren/P. Smit: *Criminal Victimisation in International Perspective: Key Findings from the 2004-2005 ICVS and EU ICS*. The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers, 2008 <[http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs/pdffiles/ICVS2004\\_05.pdf](http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs/pdffiles/ICVS2004_05.pdf)>.
- iv <http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu>.
- v [http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/euics\\_rp.htm](http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/euics_rp.htm).
- vi <http://www.urbansecurity.org>.
- vii <http://www.urbansecurity.org/index.php?id=88>.
- viii <http://www.nationamster.com>.
- ix [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/standard\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm).
- x J.J.M. van Dijk/L.G. Toornvliet: *Towards a Eurobarometer of Public Safety. Key Findings of the First Survey on Public Safety among the Residents of the European Union. Report presented at the Seminar on the Prevention of Urban Delinquency linked to Drugs Dependence*. Brussels: European Commission, 21-22 November 1996. [Registered as Special EUROBAROMETER 100 ] <[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_100\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_100_en.pdf)>.
- xi *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.
- xii *Special EUROBAROMETER 181: Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* <[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_181\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_181_en.pdf)>.
- xiii <http://www.urbaneye.net>. The final report is: Leon Hempel/Eric Töpfer: *CCTV in Europe. Final Report*. Berlin: Centre for Technology and Society, Technical University Berlin, 2004 <[http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue\\_wp15.pdf](http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf)>.
- xiv As reported in: Alexander Siedschlag: *European Countries National Security Research Policy Compared in the Light of FP 7*. WWEDU World Wide Education (Wels/Austria) – Center for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, No 10 (July 2008) <<http://www.european-security.info/asp10.pdf>>.
- xv European Forum for Urban Safety data amended by National Statistical Institute (Bulgaria): “Crimes with Penalty Inflicted and Persons Convicted by 2007” (basic data), [http://www.nsi.bg/SocialActivities\\_e/Crime\\_e.htm](http://www.nsi.bg/SocialActivities_e/Crime_e.htm).
- xvi Latest available data are from 2004.
- xvii No country profile available on EFUS, data substituted by <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/it-italy/crime> drawing from UNICRI (2001-2003).
- xviii No country profile available on EFUS, data substituted by <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/nl-netherlands/crime> drawing from UNICRI (2001-2003).
- xix *Special EUROBAROMETER 181: Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* <sup>op. cit. (fn 12)</sup>, pp. 14-15, sum of feeling “very safe” and feeling “fairly safe”.
- xx One-year victimization rate (2004) from EU ICS as an indicator for actual security according to Jan van Dijk/Robert Manchin/John van Kesteren/Gergely Hideg: *The Burden of Crime in the EU: A Comparative Analysis of the European Survey of Crime and Safety*. Brussels: Gallup Europe, 2007 <<http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/intervict/burdenofcrimefinal.pdf>>, p. 19.
- xxi Latest available figures (2003), [http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3\\_Full.pdf](http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3_Full.pdf), p. 37.
- xxii Countries ranked above, on or below average according to arithmetic mean of the two perception of safety indicator values in lines 12 and 13 (in brackets) in relation to arithmetic mean of the sum of all eight country values. Data from ICVS 2004-2005, as reported in Van Dijk/van Kesteren/Smit, *op. cit. (fn 3)*.

- xxiii “Crime” among the two most important issues on the national level, from *Standard EUROBAROMETER 62* (Autumn 2004), [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm). Question 33 (in brackets) in relation to arithmetic mean of the sum of all eight country values. Data are of limited value because national social fear of crime values are fluctuating, including changes in the scope of more than 10 percent points in three years. This can be followed in *Annex 2*: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”. However, for purposes of comparison with the actual and personal fear of crime indicators, which are only available for up to 2004, reference is made here to *EUROBAROMETER 2004* results.
- xxiv Hempel/Töpfer, op. cit. (fn 12), p. 44.
- xxv Alexander Siedschlag, op. cit. (fn 14).
- xxvi Only Bundesländer police force counted, as relevant for urban crime (federal police not counted).
- xxvii ICVS 2004-2005 and 2005 EU ICS (as compared to 2000), Van Dijk/van Kesteren/Smit, op. cit. (fn 3), p. 143.
- xxviii Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- xxix Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- xxx Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- xxxi Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- xxxii Ibid., pp. 128-129.
- xxxiii Ibid., p. 132.
- xxxiv See Valerie J. Callanan: *Feeding the Fear of Crime: Crime-related Media and Support for Three Strikes*. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2005, p. 81.
- xxxv Ibid.
- xxxvi See *Annex 2*: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”, p. 3.
- xxxvii *Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003)* finding that Italy is a high-fear country could only be reproduced for personal fear of crime.
- xxxviii *Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003)* finding that the UK is a high-fear country could not be reproduced.
- xxxix See *Annex 2*: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”.